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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
.--

The Latin American policy of the

~nited

States goes

back to men like Henry Clay and James G. Blaine, those far-seeing
visionaries who proposed and developed a Latin American policy
when most people were ignorant of, or at least, unmindful of our
southern neighbors.

There bas always been a feeling of sympa-

thetic interest on the part of Americans for those who sought
freedom from the mother country or from the crushing heel of any
tyrant.

In a measure this accounts for the attitude of most Nortt

Americans toward our neighbors when they severed themselves from
Spain and set up republics.
It is true that until recently little or no effort has
been made on our part to understand the difficulties "that have
,

sorely tried her younger and less powerful neighbors or to study
~heir

racial characteristics and customs with the friendly appli-

cation necessary to good relations be~een the states."l

•

Our interest in the emancipation of the Spanish colo"

1 Graham H. Stuart, Latin America and the United
States, New York, 1938, 10.
--- --1

\

...
2

. ,

Pies was not entirely altruistic; there was always the dangerous
~ossibility
~

of some European intrigue wbereby

pawn and fall into the hands of.

~he

~o
~as

aoEurop~an
.

th~.colony

might.be

power stronger than
,

~

weakened hand of Spain. -That could become a serious threat
our peace and security in this hemisphere.

Secondly--there'

the matter of trade.
The attitude of the United States in respect to trade

with Latin America has varied.
.&.ntense interest.

From lalS to laSS was a period of

During the next thirty years commerce with

Latin America was of little concern.

In laaO there was a revival

of interest which lasted until about 1900; from 1900 the interest
~rew

stronger and lasted throughout the period which embraced the

First World War.

The years follOwing 1930 were the depression

rears and they were filled with discouragement and later
~illed

wer~

with anxiety because of the Nazi trade and propaganda

~rives.

The success of the Nazi m11it,ary machine in~rope

~howed the importance of economic relations with Latin America. 2
-.

The fears of Thomas Jefferson seem logical and real;

~pain

could be a menace; any power could be a threat to ,the

~obbly

United States.

Is it any wonder then that Thomas Jef-

~erson

forsook some of his cher}shed ideals and concluded the

2 J. Fred Rippy, South America
paton Rouge, 1941, 44.

!n£

HemiSPh,r~

Defense,

...
.

Louisiana Purchase?

His claims to East and West Florida

~'

~Jtseem
o

to have been a bit weak but his concern is underatandable--a
foreign power on our border was a danger.
Bemis considers the:"No-Transfer

• •
Resolution~

of lell
•

which emerged from the great territorial problems of North
America as the
first significant landmark in the evolution of its Latin
American policy. • • • In 1939 it became a joint declared
policy of all the republics of the New World. It is at
once the earliest and the most recent expreRsion of the
Latin American policy of the United States. j
The "No-Transfer Resolution" was a stepping stone to the Monroe
Doctrine of le23.
During the period beginning with lelS our official
policy toward the Spanish colonies was one of neutrality, despite
the fact that unofficially we were sympathetic to the revolted
colonies.

The neutrality laws were violated to such an extent

that the Spanish Minister protested vehemently in Washingto".
Henry Clay4 had long opposed Adams' policy of nonrecognition of the republics which had broken with Spain; Clay
believed that much was to be gained by recognizing them.

Finally

3 Samuel Flagg Bemis! !h! Latin American Policy
United States, New York, 1943,.jO.

£!

~

4 Van Dusen, The Life of Henr Clay, 122, cited in
Thomas A. Bailey, ! D~B1O:mat1C His-tory £: 1h2 ~merican People,
hth ed., New York, 1'"9"5 , 10'7.
.'
,

t

\,

when there seemed.to be no possibility of Spain regaining them
through the aid of some European country, and whe,p there seemed
to be nothing to be lost by recoglrl.zing 'tihem, the United States
under James MOnroe recognized-the independence of the revolted
\

colonies.

Thus we

~ere

'

t

the first nation outside of Latin America

to recognize their independence.

This set an example for the

other nations of the world to follow.
The Monroe Doctrine, a unilateral statement of policy
that bound the United States to no nation,S was the next major
step in the Latin American policy of the United States.

Pres-

ident Monroe issued his famous message on December 2, 1823.
While the message was really a summary of American foreign poli-

I

cy, the message is best known for these two statements:
the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain are henceforth
not to be considered as subjects for future colonization
by any EUropean powers. 6

I
,

I
I

1

and
The political system of the allied powers is essentially
different in this respect from that of America. • • • \-le
owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations
existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we shall consider any attempt on their part to
•

5 Bemis, Latin American PolicX, 99.

6 J. D. Richardson, Messa~es and PaEers of the
Washington, 1896, II, ~O ;- ----\~

fresident~,

\,

,

...

extend their.system to any portioD of this hemisphere as
dangerous to our peace and safety. 7
The Monroe Doctrine is evidence that th'e United States
early developed a Latin American policy that
and realism.

It is true

.-that it

idealism

~ombiDed

did not become an important

document upon its publication but in later years it served as a
cornerstone of Latin American policy.
During the years of expansion and the realization of
our Manifest Destiny, a Latin American policy was always evident
and a definite part of our foreign policy.

Naturally, it was not

a selfless policy; a nation must have some self-interest to survive.
The United States was invited, or invited itself, to
send representatives to the Panama Congress in 1825. 8 Henry C.
Clay, always an ardent enthusiast of Latin America, urged acceptance of the invitation.

After much difficulty President John

Quincy Adams acquiesced, but unfortunately our ~epresentatives
never reached the Congress.

Little or nothing was accomplished,

yet Bailey credited this Congress with beginning the ideals of
Pan Americanism.

He said:

"None ot its recommendations was ever

7 ~. J II, 218.

8 Bailey, Diplomatic History, 195.
\

\1

.................---------------------"~...
...

-

i

6
adopted; none of its projected meetings was 'ever
"

Yet the

h~ld.

'

germs of the Pan American ideal, whic'h was to assume considerable
significance, were definitely pl~ted •."9

~ ,
t

Again in 1847-1848 another at~empt 'was made to assem..

0

ble -the peoples of this hemisphere at Lima, ~eru for the "Con-

.

'

greso Americano".

The failure of this congress, according to

Vfuite,lO was due to the fact that the United States was engaged
in war with Mexico in which we acquired nearly half of what had
been Mexican territory.

White said:

The most solemn pledges of the Congress had been made
against just such acts of "aggression" as this. The American MOnroe Doctrine had been aimed at any such gobbling up
of Latin-Amiiican territory--but only by an aggressive European powerl
The crystallization of Latin American policy

c~mes

to

the fore in the administration of Benjamin Harrison when he appointed James G. Blaine as Secretary of State.
nite positive ideas about a Latin

Am~rican

Blaine had defi-

policy.

So farseeing

was Blaine in matters concerning Latin America that he invited
the republics to meet in Washington to consider and discuss the

9

!.lli., 196

10 John W. White, Argentina,
Nation, New York, 1942, 119.

-

!h! ~

£!

StorI

11 Ibid., 1.

......

,."'.

.

\

~

,

7

methods of preventing war between the nations of America.

The

group met in Washington in 1889 with .Blaine gi Yin,S the address of
welcome before the delegates.

He' said:

Your presence here .~s no ordinary event.. It signifies
much to the people of all America today. It may signify
more in the days to come. No conference of nations has ever
assembled to consider the welfare of territorial possessions
so vast and to contemplate the possibilities of a future so
great and so inspiring. • • •
We believe that hearty cooperation, based on hearty
confidence, will save all American States from the burdens
and evils which have long and cruelly afflicted the older
nations of the world.
We believe that friendship avowed with candor and
maintained with good fa! th, wili remove from American States
the necessity of guarding boundary lines between themselves
with fortifications and military force.
We believe that friendship and not force, the spirit of
just law and not the violence of the mob, should be the
recognized rule of administration between the American
nations and in American nations. l 2
Blaine 'also developed the idea of the United States
acting as arbiter of disputes between the American republics, and
,

the American republics and Europe instead of turning to nonAmericans for aid in settling such disputes as might arise.

The

\,

'4

outstanding feature of Blaine's Latin American policy, however,
12 Senate Executive Documents, Vol. 14, No. 232,
Pt. 1, 51st Congress,-lst Session, Washington, 1890, 39-42.
\

,

s
was the meeting in,1889 of the First International American
Conference in Washington.

Bemis commented on

thi~

conference:

The Secretary's ostensible purpose in assembling the
Conference seems to have been the'promotions of trade and
arbitration; but, • • • it was the harbinger of a memorable
movement that was to yield richer results in riper times, as
Blaine himr~lf prophesied in his closing address to the
delegates. j
This Congress failed to accomplish as much as had been
hoped for but it did achieve the formation of what came to be
known as the Pan American Union.

Baileyl4 contended that the

First International Congress was the wedge for the future gatherings.

He feels that the friendly manner shown to the Latin Amer-

icans helped to dispel their suspicions.
~ariff

Finally the reciprocal

reductions by treaty, which the Conference found to be

. Plore practical than a customs union, gained considerable backing.
The advent of imperialism led to a new era in our Latin
~erican

policy marked by the Cuban question and numerous others

:lhich involved Latin America in our destiny.
~mperialistic

This era with its

tendencies, the policy of expediency, nonrecog-

~ition, Platt Amendment, intervention, exploitation, "Big Stick"

\,

diplomacy, dollar diplomacy and interference did not help to
13

,

Bemis, Latin American Policr, 126.

14 Bailey, Diplomatic History, 445.
\

\

9
. create any feelings of good will or neighborliness.
: cies only helped to

a~ouse

These pol1-

further hatred an! suspicion of our
~,

" Ineighbors toward our motives the~ and ~n the years to come.
Hinton15 comments orr these events in his biography ofHull, saying:
The whole episode of lS9S had awakened apprehensions
among the Latin-American republics. These were not allayed
by subsequent developments between the United States and
Cuba and were fanned to white heat by the revolution which
separated Panama from Colombia and made possible the construction of the Panama Canal. There was considerable feeling among our neighbors to the south that the United States
had driven Spain out of Cuba only to make the island an
American dependency as had been done in Puerto Rico and the
Philippines. The imposition of the Platt Amendment, giving
the United States the right to intervene in Cuban affairs
for ~he pur~ose of preserving order, lent color to their
suspJ. cion. J.b
The diplomacy created by the Panama question did not
alleviate the suspicions of our neighbors and the "Big Stick" 'diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt helped to widen the brea.ch.

The

Roosevelt pronouncement, generally referred to as the Roosevelt
corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, justified the intervention in
Latin America by either the United States or a foreign country,
was proclaimed on December 6, 1904, in these words of Roosevelt:

~ ~

90. -

15 Harold Hinton is a newspaper man who writes for the
Times. He has also written a biography of Cordell Hull.
16 Harold B. Hinton, Cordell

~,

Garden City, 1942,
\

\,

...
10

• • • All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any
country whose people conduct themselves well ,.can count upon
our hearty friendship. Chronic wrongdoing • • • may in
America as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by .
some civilized nation, and in the-Western Hemisphere the
adherence of the United States, however, reluctantly in
flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the
exercise of an international police power. l ·t
Bailey maintained that public opinion in the United
States generally supported the Roosevelt corollary, while in Latin
America very little concern was shown. 1S Several years later when
~rines

were landed in Central American and Caribbean republics to

enforce the Roosevelt corollary, Latin America protested strongly.
Taft and his dollar diplomacy hardly added an amicable
~hapter

to Latin American affairs, nor did Wilson's watchful

~aiting.
~t

The Panama Canal project became a realization and with

came an awakened interest in our sister republics.

~rderliness

~ore

~as

especially, those near the Big'Ditch, became more and

important to the Canal.

~nvested

Their

Taft had been anxious to have money

in Latin America and once the investments were made, it

an easy, logical step for his and the follOwing adminis-

trations to protect the investors and their investments under the
17 Congressional Record, 58th Cong., 3rd Sess., Tuesda),'
December 6, 1904, Vol: 39, pt. I, Washington, 1905, 19.
1$ Bailey,

Diplomat~c

Ristor!, 559.
\

\,

11

oosevelt corollary.

It was necessary to justify the interventio

y pointing
to the benefits secured to' Latin America
under
.
,,
, our
, ,
rotective and profitable guidance, to say nothing of the benefit
accrued to the investors of the United States.
Woodrow Wilson's administration marked a beginning of
the repudiation of economic imperialism, which was interrupted by
World War I.

Wi th the repudiation of our former Latin American

, policy there began a period of more satisfactory relations with
our southern neighbors.

The sky was not entirely cloudless but

it began to point to happier days.

Wilson was fundamentally a
noninterventionist despite his intervention in Mexico. Bemis19
claimed that Wilson really was the inspiration for the new Latin

American pollcy which came to be known as the Good Neighbor
policy under Franklin D. Roosevelt.

,.
f':

It was Secretary of State Charles E. lfughes who made
strides toward the liquidation of the policy of intervention
,

which the United States had used in Latin America.

He tried to

convince the republics to the south that the "Big Stick" did not
mean imperialism.

His first step in the liquidation process was

,(lorking out of a plan for the evacuation of the Marines from the
Dominican Republic.
The Washington Conference of 1922-1923 was held under
\

19 BemiS, Latin American Policy, 199.

-".-,.~.

12

, Hughes's chairmanship.
ties.

This Conference produced thirteen tr~a"
f
According to Bemis 20 these treaties were ,a miniature

experiment in inter-American peace
. and solidarity worked out in
Washington by Hughes'land Sumner Welles.

"To him

Sumner \'1elles

has been ascribed the elaboration if not the inspiration of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy.,,2l
Hughes had taken great care to make it clear that he did not
accept the Roosevelt corollary to the MOnroe Doctrine.

Thus did

Hughes do his part to 'create more amicable relations between the
Americas by his attempts to get rid of intervention and the
fostering of good will with our neighbors.
The new Secretary of State, Kellogg directed J. Reuben
Clark, Jr., Undersecretary of State, to work out an historical
explanation of the MOnroe Doctrine to show that the Roosevelt
corollary was not a legitimate offspring of the Monroe Doctrine.
The result is a collection of documents giving the
background, principles, and instances which might be or have
been considered as falling wi thin the principles of the Monroe

- - --- ----

Doctrine.

It is known as the Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine •
......................................
.........~
This memorandum rejects the Roosevelt corollary and the imperialistic principles of our foreign policy.

·.-....

~

\\

20

~.,

21

Ibid., 20$.

207-208.

\

,\

,

13
In the preface Clark made it clear that the Monroe
Doctrine does not concern itself with purely
affairs.

in~er-American

The author said:

• • • The DOctrine .states a case of the United States
vs Europe, and nQt of the United States vs Latin America. • •• So far as Latin America i~ concerned the Doctrine
is now, and always has been, not an instrument of violence
and oppression but an unbought, fully bestowed, and wholly
effective guaranty of their freedom, independence, and
territo~~al integrity against the imperialistic designs of
Europe.
.
I

Thus this Memorandum backed up the Hughes interpreta,tion.

It repudiated the corollary but preserved the right of

intervention. 23
Herbert Hoover was another staunch believer in cultivating the friendship and good will of our neighbors.

His good

will trip to Latin America and his friendly atti.tude as Presidentelect did much to foster good feelings.

In his inaugural address

he stressed the fact that we did not desire any economic or
territorial domination of any other people.

He declared:

The United States fully accepts the profound truth that
our own progress, prosperity and peace are interlocked with
the progress, prosperity and peace of all humanity. The
whole world is at peace. The dangers to a continuation of
this peace today are largely the fear and suspicion which
still haunt the world. No suspicion or fear can be rightfully directed toward our country.
22 J. Reuben Clark, Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine,
Washington, 1930,xxiv.
- \

23

Bemis, Latin

America~

PolicX, 22.

\,

,

14
Those who have a true understanding of America know
that we have no desire for territorial expansion, for
economic or othe~ domination of .other people~. Such
purposes are repugnant to our ideals of h~an freedom.
• • • the American people are engrossed in the building
for themselves of a new economic 'system, a new social
system, a new political .system--all of which are characterized by aspirations of freedom of opp~4tunity and
thereby are the negation of imperialism.
Hoover proved his policy regarding Latin America and
the abandonment of dollar diplomacy, intervention, and imperialism when he withdrew the last troops from Haiti and Nicaragua
and 'again when he failed to exercise treaty rights on several
occasions.

He was determined to carry out his policy of nonin-

tervention, de facto recognition, and to prove our departure from
imperialism.
Franklin D. Roosevelt came to the presidency with
rather definite ideas against intervention in the home affairs of
i

I
I

our neighbors and the need for joint action in case of distress
in one of our neighboring countries.

At his inauguration March 4,

.

1933, he had the good fortune to name the policy which we rv"
call the Good Neighbor policy, by referring to the polie'
administration as that of the good
Latin America--but the whole world.

neighbor--nJ~.

~,.;.'

his

\,

::leaning

In the inaugural address he

said:

.
24 Senate Miscellaneous Documents, 1-39, 'iJ.st Cong.,
1st Sess., Document 1, Mardi 4, 1929, washiiigton, 1929, :7.

,

15
In the field of world policy, I w,ould dedicate this
Nation to the policy of the good neighbor--the neighbor who
resolutely respects himself, and, because he,~oes so,
respects the rights of others--the neighbor who respects
his obligations and respects the sanctity of agreements in
and with a world of neighbors. We now realize as we have
never realized before our-interdependence on each other;25
that we cannot merely take, but must give as well • • • •
Thus these were the major steps which led to the Good
: Neighbor policy as we know it today.

It was founded on the

repudiation of imperialism, dollar diplomacy, "Big Stick", and
intervention; it was founded on a freer flow of trade, nonI

intervention in the affairs of our neighbors, consultation,
amicable relations, and coequality.

2£

25 Samuel I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses
Franklin ~. Roosevelt, Vol. II,-,t933) New YOrK; ~g, 131. .

\,

,

CHAPTER J:I

..
,

HULL AND NONINTERVENTION
..--

For the world and

especiall~

£or Latin America,

Roosevelt's choice of a Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, was an
extremely fortunate one.

In Cordell Hull was found one devoted

to a cause which he put above all else, even the possibility of
election to the highest office in our land.

He firmly believed

that the security of the United States was based on trade and,
therefore, it was necessary to have a freer flow of trade; that
it was necessary for us to maintain amicable relations with our
neighbors; that it was necessary to follow a policy of noninterference and nonintervention.

These were the fundamental princi-

ples of Hull's Latin American policy.

Because Hull was an intel-

lectual idealist, sincere, loyal, patient, yet strong, firm,
amiable, shrewd and persistent he was able to realize the policy
v/hich he had so carefully planned.

\.

Friends of Hull advised him not to accept the post
offered by President Roosevelt.

He weighed the matter a long

time and very carefully; he came to the decision to accept because he saw in the Department of State an opportunity to

16

.... -.......... ..,-

\

"

"

17
practice some of his fundamental beliefs.

For example,

h~:l

felt

that the economic situation at this period in our,.history .was
, caused by restrictive trade barriers.~ In the office of Secretary of State, Hull thought that he would'nave a better oppor-.
tunity to initiate the plans which wouldtielp to obliterate some
of the restrictive measures.

In accepting the office he had a

talk with the President in which he made it perfectly clear that
i

the only condition under which he would
that he was to have a perfectly free

~ccept

han~;

the office was

it was not to be a

post at which he would merely carryon the correspondence of the
State Department. 2 With this freedom which he' demanded he knew
full well the responsibility and accepted the office with hope
and courage.
The following quotation from

~ullts

statement on inter-

national policies sums up his policy in his own words:
This country constantly and consistently advocates
maintenance of peace. We advocate national and international self-restraint. We advocate abstinence by all
nations from use of force in pursuit of policy and from
interference in the internal affairs of other nations.
We advocate adjustment of problems in international
relations by processes of peaceful negotiation and agreement. We advocate faithful observance of international
agreements. Upholding the principle of sanctity of

1949, 310.

1

Graham H. Stuart,

~

Department

2! State, New York,

2 Cordell Hull, ~ lvlemo.irs of Cordell Huli, >New York,
1948, I, 158 •

. .....
'

~,.

..

'.

18
treaties we believe in modification of provisions of
treaties, wh'en n~ed therefor arises, by orderly processes
carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and accommodations. We believe in respect by all nations for ~~e
rights of others and performance by all nation~ of
established obligations. We stand for revitalizing and
strengthening of international law. We advocate steps
toward promotion of economic security and stability the
world over. We advocate lowering or removing of excessive
barriers in international trade. We seek effective
equality of commercial opportunity and we urge upon all
nations application of the principle of equality of treatment. We believe in limitation and reduction of armament.
Realizing the necessity for maintaining armed forces adequate for national security, we are prepared to reduce or
increase our own armed forces in proportion to reductions
or increases made by other countries. We avoid entering
into alliances or entangling commitments but we believe in
cooperative effort by peaceful and practicable~means in
support of the principles hereinbefore stated.~
Roosevelt addressed the Pan American Union on April 14,

1933, and in this address he emphasized our poll'cy toward Latin
~erica. Bemis 4 said that Roosevelt did not really announce a
:lett(

policy; the speech reflected the conclusions of Sumner Welles 1

book, Naboth's Vineyard.

In his address Roosevelt said:

Your Americanism and mine must be a structure built of
confidence, cemented by a sympathy which recognizes only
equality and fraternity. It finds its source in the hearts
of men and dwells in the temple of the intellect.
We all of us have peculiar problems, and, to speak
frankly, the interest of our own citizens must, in each
instant, come first. But it is equally true that it is of

3 Cordell

Hull~

Fundamental Principles of Internation-

II Policy, Washington, 19J7, 1.

4 Bemis, Latin American Policy, 259.

\

\,

19
vital interest to every Nation of this Continent that the
American Governments, individually, take" without further
delay, such action as may be pos'sible to abolish all unnecessary and artificial barriers and restriction~ which
now hamper the healthy flQw,of trade between the peoples
of the American Republic.'
.

.

--

.

This last sentence is of extreme importance because it
expresses the philosophy and hope of Secretary of State, Cordell
Hull.

Hull fought for the lowering of trade barriers during his

long term of office; he felt that trade barriers were partly
responsible for our economic ills during the depression and definitely responsible for our unfavorable balance of trade.

As

early as 1914 Hull had formulated this philosophy and felt that
if we could get rid of economic rivalry it would enable us to
increase commercial exchanges among nations and remove nunnatural
obstruction to trade, we would gp a long way toward eliminating
war itself. n6 Hull went on to add:
The year 1916 is a milestone in my political thinking.
Then for the first time openly I enlarged my views on trade
and tariffs from the national to the international theater.
Hitherto I had fought hard for lower tariffs, largely
because of their immediate domestic effect. I believe that
high tariffs meant a higher cost of living for American
citizens. They assisted in building up monoplies and trusts
By cutting dotm the sales of other countries to us, the?
also cut dotm the purchases by other countries from us.
In considering the Latin American policy of Cordell

-

5

Rosenman, Publig Papers £! Roosevelt, II, (1933),

130..;.131.

\

6 Hull, Memoirs, I, 84.
7 Ibid., 81.
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ull, it is necessary to take into consideration the attitude of
tin America toward the

~Colossus

of the

North~ a~d

thereby judg

he influence which Hull exerted to bring about more amicable reations aided and abetted to some extent by the exigencies of
orld War II.
The temperament and nature of the Latin American must
also be taken into account.

His background is essentially Euro-

pean; his culture and heritage are essentially European.

He feEd

a closer tie to Europe than he does to the United States.

The

Latin American is by nature filled with pride and an intense
spirit of nationalism.
Argentina, especially, has felt that her place in Latin
America is that of the leader.

She has felt an unusually strong

antipathy for the United States because she feels that we are
trying to usurp her position of leadership in South America and
because of our refusal to accept Argentine beef because we are
afraid of the spread of hoof and mouth disease into our country.

,

Practically every step of the way Argentina has fought the United
States. g
Cordell Hullts philosophy toward the Good Neighbor
POlicy of the admini stration can best be summed up in his o\m
'.'lords:
\

'

.'

The question of Argentina will be discussed in a
later chaptero
$

,

...
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A decade of steady implementation of the Good Neighbor
policy was now to follow. It was not always to be smooth
rafting, and we were to encounter to\meads i:p.our stream of
friendship. Great patience was required and disappointments were sure to be encountered. But
had long before
realized that the achievemeht of worthwhile aims often
called for extreme patience and sometimes serious personal
and official embarrassment, and I therefore formed a definite resolution that I would undergo any such experienceofor
the sake of vitally important long-view-accomplishments.~

t

Throughout his administration Hull did all he could to
implement the good will policy toward our neighbors.

He was ably

assisted by his assistant Sumner Welles, a career diplomat, and
also by a well qualified group of experts in the Division of
Latin American Affairs.

Sumner Welles had general jurisdiction
over the Department of Inter-American Affairs lO and formulated
many of the plans and policies.
The Latin American world was almost unknown to Hull.
His only previous experience with the area had been during the
I

Spanish American War when Hull served with the army in Cuba.
Certainly this did not prepare him for- the tasks at hand, in fact
this was an unsatisfactory backgroundll for one who was to formulate and direct the affairs of the United States with such a
large and complex.area as Latin America.

\,

However, what Hull

,
9 Hull, Memoirs, I, 350.
1944, 200.

10

~

f2!

Decision, New York,
\

11

...,"""'-. .

Sumner Welles,
Stuart,

~epartme~~

2!

State, 310.
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: lacked in background and experience,

h~

: and devotion to the job at hand and the

made, up for in sincerity
~llingne~,15

to work un- .

, tiringly for the policy.
Hull carefully checked the character and the fitness of
officers in the Department of State and kept most of the seasoned,

~

experienced persons in the key positions which they had held
previously.12 He inaugurated the system of daily press conferences l ) and no matter how busy he was he insisted upon receiving
the representatives of the press and radio.

In his relations

with the diplomatic corps, Hull believed in complete frankness
and demanded that his subordinates deal with problems in the same
frank manner. l4
Hull's heritage in Latin America was not a pleasant one

In his Memoirs, he said:
Our inheritance of ill will was grim. It was probated
under the name of Intervention; intervention in Panama to
separate Panama from Colombia and build the Panama Canal;
intervention in Mexico; interventionlin Cuba; intervention
in Haiti; intervention in Nicaragua. 5
Hull adds that not only was there this feeling against us but

\ ..

also there was a lack of unity among the republics themselves •

•

The Chaco War was in full swing between Paraguay and Bolivia.

,

:

'-

I, 180.

12

Hull,

13

Stuart, Department

14

~.,

Memoir~,

.2A

315.

15 Hull, _Memoirs
.. •.... ,.,,-_ .. ' I, 308.
,

State, 314 •

,
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A conflict was smoldering between Colombia and Peru over a border.
~n Cuba a revolution was brewing. 16
The fundamental policy 6f Hull was

on~

of noninter-

~ention in the affairs of Latin America.~ He. had resolved th~t te
pould be ~riends only if we abandoned the right to intervene in
~heir

internal affairs.

He had helped to write the plank in the

Democratic platform in 1932 which stated "No interference in the
1nterna1 affairs of other nations" and also "Cooperation with
nations of the Western Hemisphere to maintain the spirit of the
t,ionroe Doctrine. "17
Hull realized that Latin American policy had to be based

pn "mutually beneficial policies and principles, political, eco-

~omic

and morB:l."l8. These principles and policies

~p by actions and not merely by lip service.

must\~e
....
-,

backed

These act~nsJ he

~aintained, must be "delicate and tactfu1."l9 It is our job to

establish trust and confidence thereby creating a new relationship with our neighbors.
When Hull
by
•

ha~

been in office only two weeks he was askec

the League of Nations to join in settling the Leticia border

Jispute between Colombia and Peru.

16
17

!12:!.s!. ,
!.ill. ,

309.
309-310.

1a Ibid. , 310.
19 Ibid.

Roosevelt and Hull decided

\

\

.

to cooperate by having a representative take part but without the
~ower

to vote.

Hull commented on this cooperati v,e move:-

Our acceptance signified our willingness to cooperate
with other nations in the settlement of Latin American
.
questions. Unilateral action on our part was now in the
discard. We began to apply a principle to which we adhered
in the years to follow. This was to refrain from acting
until after having consulted with all the other interested
nations. Only in this way could we work from under the deepseated resentment engendered in L~ain America by previous
one-sided actions of our country.
Cordell Hull proved himself in the eyes of the Haitians
~hen

he announced that an executive agreement was signed which

provided for the withdrawal of United States Marines from Haiti by
I

the end of October, 1934.

f

since 1915.

The Marines had been stationed there

The executive agreement also provided less stringent

financial arrangements for Haiti which would naturally aid her
economic recovery.
I

Hull credited the new pact to the fact that

Haiti, under the more stable leadership of President Stenio

I ~incent, had bettered conditions in Haiti 'to a marked degree. 21
I

Comment was made on the fact that an executive agreement

!,

aad been used rather than a formal treaty.

I

York Time~, Secretary Hull said:

!

!

had

According to the ~

"that the executive agreement

•

merely been found a quicker method of arriving at the settle-

20

!£!£.,

21

~

310-311.

1.2!:.!£ Times, August 9, 1933, pt. 1,

~:~:

,
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~ent desired by both countries."22

The Chicago Daily

~

;'pulling Out of Haiti" in which

ran an editorial

t~ey

,~ntitled

said that the pulling out of

-tai ti was not receiving the attention that" it should because of
vhe Cuban crisis.

The editorial commented that the executive

19reement "represents a significant modification of this country's
Caribbean policy and should contribute much to that improvement
Jf relations with other Latin American nations • • • • "23

The

3ditorial went on to state that much criticism had been leveled
;

~t

us because of our policy of intervention which sometimes led

to exploitation of "backward people for the profit of American
capital."24

The same editorial pointed out that Haiti has gJ.ven

very little recognition to the preservation of law and order and
the improvement in finance, public health and welfare under the
benevolent hand of the United States. 25
These early references to Hull's actions on Latin
American policy are significant in that

th~y

show plainly the

desire and intention to carry out the Good Neighbor policy with

.

the active cooperation of the press because the overall coverage
\'las fa.vorable at this time.

23

-Ibid.
Chicago

24

~.

25

Ibid.

22

~ailI

Much damage can be and is done by

News, August 11, 1933,

pt.\l~

14:1.

\,
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I

the press when disparaging remarks are made by hostile writers,
as will be pointed out in a later instance.

..

The next major problem. of the Secretary was that of

.

'

Cuba.

The Cuban situation had been growing more, difficult since

1925 because of the dictatorship of General Machado.
i

Things had

gone from bad to worse under his regime; law and order were
practically unknown.

The Platt Amendment to the treaty of 1903

gave the United States the right to intervene in Cuba to preserve
independence and maintain a government which could guarantee
life, property, and individual lib~rty.26

However, Roosevelt and

Hull were determined to carry out their policy of nonintervention
and in the interest of that policy, despite the efforts of some
quarters to force the issue, they steadfastly refused to send

!

iI

!

!
,

Marines into Cuba.
A United Press dispatch 27 appeared in the ~ ~
Times stated that the administration was standing on its policy
of nonintervention and that Welles was "cooperating with the var-'
ious political factions in an effort to prevent further blood-

!.

shed. "28

26

Hull, Memoirs, I, 312-313.

27 The United Press Associations serve 1004 newspapers
in the United States and 967 foreign papers. This is a total of
~971 papers.
This data was secured from the United P~ess office
In New York in answer to a letter of inquiry to the writer.
28

~ ~ ~~,

August 9, 1933, pt. 1, 2:4.

I

r

27

I
I
I staff

The Chicago Daily!!!! in a dispatch from Fred. Reed,
correspondent in Washington, said that a department officiaJ

I maintained that intervention would not be necessary because this
.
.

I official
was sure that
.
29
l

I

I

time is up.n

Welles'~1:ould

persuade Machado that nhis
. .
•
This action on the part'of Welles could certainly
I

if

I be interpreted as a type of interference and in opposition to the

I
I
I
I
I
I

~

I
f

I

I

principles of Hull.
Roosevelt appealed to Cuba to submerge its political
differences and to establish a government Which could maintain
law and order and guarantee life and property.

--------

A New York Times

-

article interpreted this as an nappeal as urging Machado to quit
if necessary.n3 0
The Chicago Daily

~ editorial of August

10th accused

I

Machado of spreading propaganda to the effect that the United
States was interfering in the affairs or Cuba.

The paper stoutly

defended the position or Welles and the, Roosevelt administration.
The editorial said:

"Both Welles and the Roosevelt adminis-

,

tration have displayed such extreme solicitude for Cuban rights

\

and • • • for Machado's prerogatives that there is not the

.

.

slightest excuse for that sort of propaganda."

29

Chicago DailI

30

~

31

Chicago Dailz

~,

31

The editorial

August 9, 1933, pt. 1, 2:5.

York Times, August 10, 1933, pt. 1,
~,

\l:~.

August 10, pt. 1, 16:1.
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I also commented on the fact that some Lati~ Americans will ma~e
I

i

t f

'

the most of the Cuban situation to spread prejudice against ~e
United States and thus "block

Roosevelt's program for
-'
32
more cordial relations between the American peoples'."
The

~ ~

Pre~ident

Times said that the diplomats of Latin

America discussed the possibility of intervention-.

They agreed

that such a step by this country would be an unpopular move
throughout Latin America.

Such a move would go far to "counter-

act the good effect of the agreement to evacuate our Marines from
Haiti. "33

An editorial appeared in the

Chicag~

Daily Tribune

which credited the government in its ac,tions in the Cuban affair;
it stated the American government has been "approaching the situation for several months with as much discretion as possible.
The administration • • • desires to avoid extreme action which

I
I
I

could be taken under an interpretation, of
. the Platt Amendment."34

I

The days came and went but the Chicago Daill
covered the Cuban crisis watchfully.

I

~

An editorial accused

\

Machado of hoping for armed intervention in the belief that such
intervention would strengthen his cause and keep him in office.

\ 12:1.

I

32

ill.£.

33

~ ~

34

Chicago Dail! Tribune, August 11, 1933, pt. 1,

Times, August 10, 1933, pt. 1,

\1~,7.

,

.
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However, the Department of State was too astute to fall into that
line of reasoning.

The editorial pointed out that- the adminis-

..

tration has attempted to further .good will in Cuba by the Rooserelt program of economic assistance and the c?ntemplation of a
~eciprocal

tariff agreement, both of which have been hampered by

~he political turmoil and strife in Cuba. 35
The sugar question loomed ominous in the Cuban sit~ation said the Chicago Daily News. 36 This paper maintained that

f

~ugar

may.have a "decisive influence upon the political as well

s the economic future of the island republic and, possibly upon

rhe whole future relationship of the United States to all Latin
'\merica. ,,37
Arthur Krock36 writing from Washington for the ~ ~
~imes

believed that Hull "won his spurs" in the Cuban situation.

~rock later awarded the spurs to Hull again for his work at
o

.1ontevideo.2

Krock added that the Department of State officials

:elt that recent events had convinced them that Hull was being
~ndermined

~risis

in the State Department but his handling of the Cuban

has shown that he is determined "slow to action, but when

35

Chicago

Dai1l~,

August 14, 1933, pt. 1, 10:1.

36 Ibid., August 17, 1933, pt. 1, 16:1.

37 I!?i£.
\ :3$ ~ ~ Times, August 17, 1933, pt. 1, 16:5.
L
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he moves he moves·with force, courage' and firmness. n39
During the Cuban crisis, Mr. Hull was i·n communication
i

with the ambassadors of Latin

~erica;

he consulted with thell

before any action was taken by the State Department which would
be of any interest to them or affect them.

This policy was ad-

vantageous because it strengthened our hand with the Latin Americans and caused much less resentment than if we had acted,
alone without co~su1tation with our neighbors. 40
On September 6th, the President after conferring with
representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Chile .and Mexico issued a
statement regarding the Cuban situation.

He clearly stated that

information about Cuba would be available to the Latin American
,countries; he also made it clear that we had no desire to inter!

vene and Cuba should obtain a satisfactory government of its
o\m. 4l

The Chicago Daily Tribune reminded its readers that
"Disorders are a reflection on Uncle, but anything done to help
out is a cause for reproach. n42

True to its isolationist poli-

cies the editorial added that the lesson of Cuba should teach the

,

39 Ibid.

14:2.

40

Hull, Memoirs, I, 314.

41

lli.£.

42

Chicago DailX Tribune, November 13, 1933, pt. 1
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nited States something in regard to the Philippines, "principally either to stay in, or, in getting out, get out bag and
,paggage.

"43
Edi torial comment inthe Chicam Daily News 44 urged a

eturn to the pre-Wilsonian policy of recognition for a foreign
government which demonstrates the sovereignty of the government •
. ince de facto recognition has been a policy of the United States

~ince

earliest times, it does not seem that this advice is unsoun

rt this time.

The Chicago Daill Tribune concurred in this opin-

.·lon of recognition of Cuba's government in an editorial cri tiising Welles' actions in Cuba and suggested that American diploats not be allowed to play one faction against ·the other. 45
(elleS denied that he had used any pressure or influence in Cuba
~hich could be construed as interference or intervention. 46
In the latter part of November Roosevelt issued a stateent of policy in which he declared Washington
stood ready to
,
.ecognize any government Which demonstrates itself representative
.\

43

~.

44

Chicago Daily

rl,.:l.

45

Chicago Daily Tribune., November 25, 1933, pt. 1,

.

46 Sumner Wel~es, Tw~ Years g! the Good Neigh~ Policy
of State, Lat'2.n Amerl.c:an--serl. es-;-No:-II, v.'.:l~hl..ngton,
1

~)cpt'.rtment

,.935, 9-10.

i

~,

November 21, 1933, pt. 1, 16.:1.

\

~

____

-------~--)*-t--"t------

______________
32

,! of its'people and able to secure their support. The

Chicag~

Dail'y News 47 said that this policy should command··favor thro~ihou1
Latin

~erica;

it should dispel

dices our neighbors have.

~ome

of the suspicions and preju-

Here, then,

~as

a return to the prin-

ciple of de facto recognition by the United States.
As the months progressed conditions were far from satisfactory in Cuba.

The Chica~~ Dailz News 48 suggested that some

American business men would like to see the disorder grow in Cuba
in order to force the United States to intervene.

The paper

despaired of such intervention because nothing would be gained
from intervention and certainly intervention would not fit the
Cubans for self-government any more

th~n

intervention had e-

quipped any other country for self-government.
On January 26, 1934 the Chicago Daill News ran an editorial in which the paper commented that the Cuban situation had
been handled in a sympathetic manner a?d that if the Cubans
failed to "improve the responsibility cannot fairly be placed on
the vfuite House. n49

The editorial also ~entioned that some eco-

\

nomic aid was probable for Cuba.

47

Chica~~

48

~.,

Daill

~

November 25, 1933, pt. 1, 10:1.

December 21, 1933, pt. 1, 16:2.

49 Ibid., January 26, 1934, pt. 1, 18:1.
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Finally 'a treaty was Signed with Cuba May 24, 1934.

By
i

this treaty we gave up the right to intervene in euba thus completely abrogated the Platt Amendment.

This proved that what

Hull said he meant--nonintervention in the affairs of our neighbors.
The Detroit

~

torial which commented:

Press paid tribute to Hull in an edi-

"The patience and restraint he displayed

in the face of a difficult situation in Cuba is but one example
of a policy of good neighborliness which has regained for the
United States the confidence and good will of other American republics. ,,50
As late,as January 24th, 1935, the Chicago Daily
une 51 denounced the efforts we made in Cuba.

-tained that we have tried control,
abrogated the Platt

Amen~ent.

~

The Tribune main-

we have tried advice.

We

Our only measures of success were
,

in the field of sanitation and health.,

The

Tribun~

inferred that

,perhaps American manipulation had contributed to the disorders in \
Cuba.

According to the editorial,["~uba Heads for the Jungle",

is the title of the editorial:1"Cuba is sliding back into the
semi-barbarism or complete barbarism of'jungle society.,,52

1- .

I

50 Detroit Free Pres2,
2,
1934, pt. ~:b.
nocember

) 10: 2.

I
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Regardless of the state of society in Cuba, it does not
seem that the Chicago Dailz
discuss the situation.

Tribun~

need have used such terms to

It appear.s to be a case of bad judgment

.--

and a lack of courtesy to use such oppobrious language in discuss
ing one of the very neighbors we hoped to win to our Good Neighbo
policy.

Such an editorial can only hope to alienate our neigh-

borsl
Prior to all this the Seventh International Conference
of American States was held in MOntevideo in December of 1933.
This Conference is significant because it laid the ground work fo
future cooperation between the American republics.
vIas

The outlook

not too favorable for the Conference because of the failure

0

the London Economic Conference and the Geneva meeting for militar
disarmament. 53
President Roosevelt regarded the meeting to be one of
great importance, an opportunity to
accord among the Americas.

f~ther

understanding and

With this in mind he directed Secre-

tary of State Cordell Hull to attend in person. 54 On the way to
lthe Conference Hull stopped at various ports of call to establish
'personal contact and relations with the statesmen of the various

L
I

i

i
!YOrk,

53 Hull, Memo~r~, I, 317.
5It- \Vilfred Funk, ed., ]?ooseveltts Foreir;l1 P;)licy, New

191~2,

Item 19, 28-29.
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countries.

Both Roosevelt and Hull ,had the highest hopes for the

success of the Conference and Hull did not lose a'· single opportunity to further the cause of the Good Neighbor policy from the
time of his appointment to he'ad the

U~ ted

States delegation unti"1

he returned home.
I

Hull expressed himself on the forthcoming Conference in
his Addresses

~

Statements saying, that a "more substantial

step forward in Pan American unity can and • • • will be taken at
¥mntevideo than all others within two decades.";;

He realized

full well that there were impediments to the success of the
Conference but he was confident that it could be brought to a
successful conclusion.
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia protested that
the time was not ripe for the Conference. 56

Argentina was partic

ularly adamant and until the very end could not make up her mind
to send a delegate to attend the Conference.
Hull was anxious to present to the Conference an economic resolution for lower tariffs and the abolition of trade
restrictions. Fundamentally the program 57 provided for a tariff

1935, 7.

5; Cordell Hull,Addresses
56 Hull,
57

~oi~~,

llli., 320.

~

Statements, \'lashington,

I, 317.
\
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,
the initiation or bilateral orplurilateral negotiations

for the removal or restrictions on commerce and reductions or
tariff rates.

Governments were

~o

try 'tc> eliminate restrictions

and duties which clearly lacke'd economic justification.

The

governments were also to agree to incorporate in these "trade
agreements the most-favored-nation principle in its unconditional
and unrestricted form, this to be applieq to all forms and methods of control of imports and not only to import duties."58

In

preparing the resolution Hull says he hoped the whole world could
be included in the idea; it was not to be confined to the New
World alone.

"Measures like my economic resolution could have

,been applied as logically to the Eastern Hemisphere as to our
own. n59
Regarding this economic resolution the New York Times 60
-----~-

,

in an editorial stated the fact that although Hull may not be
forbidden to pursue his work on trade agreements,
he cannot hope
,
'

to bring it to function unless there is a change of attitude on
the part of the President.

An~

change the President's attitude

\,

he did.
The delegation arrived at Montevideo on November 2$,

5g Ibid.
59 lli.£., 321.
\

,•,

I~

...

60

~ ~

\
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I

I

I to find nthe atmosphere or 'ambiente' as the local press des.
i

cribed it, was excited and not too promising. n6l

Hinton contende

that the "Chaco War, North American efforts to collect defaulted
\

" bonds, the threat of intervention in Cuba, and the presence of th
Uni ted States Marines 62 in Nicaragua would 'c'ombine to throw a
chill over the gathering."

Hull hastily took counsel with his

political self and decided positive action was needed.
The attitude toward Hull upon his arrival at Montevideo
was not a warm one.

He was treated with suspicion and distrust.

The newspapers of Montevideo and Buenos Aires "rawhided our country and our delegation, called us names,. and-threw out the idea
that we were down there as usual, for purely selfish narrow purposes."63

The Brazilian press hailed Hull as the first repre-

sentative of President Roosevelt's New Deal to visit Latin America.

They expressed the hope that Hull's visit would bring about

an understanding between the United States
and Brazil and some
,

solution of the economic problems of the two countries. 64

-

\

61

Hinton, Cordell

~,

245.

62 Hinton is misinformed on the fact of the r,1arines
toeing in Nicaragua. The Marines were withdrawn after the 1932
i~J-ections and the last \-"lera evacuated on January 2, 1933.
See
,);)}-,,!..Ci: !:1.r;~?:E..::::,c., 1933,. New York, (no publication date), 689. iUSO
12 '';0 ~ ~ IntornD.;t~onal ~~, 1933.

I

63

Hull, M,emoirs, I, 324.

64

~. ~ Time~,

\

~

November 25, 1933, pt. 1; 3:1.
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Hull called on the delegations in Montevideo without
making an appointment.

These

informa~

calls usually lasted thir-

ty to forty minutes and created a. better feeling and paved the
way for closer cooperation.

Hull always tried to impress the

delegations with the fact that we were there .with the firm intent
to carry out the doctrine of the good neighbor.

We simply wanted

to cooperate fully with all Latin American countries in promoting
the political and economic ideals in which we are all alike and
mutually interested. 65

These informal 'calls created a feeling of

friendliness and warmth that a more formal approach could not
have created.
Argentina preeented a problem.
Ibegan the

~ ~

Times predicted

~~t

Even before the meeting
Argentina would "assume

leadership of South American affairs and organize a regional
South American bloc, opposed to the United States. n66 It is a
fact that Argentina opposed our actions , for some time and hastened to organize her sister republics against us whenever she
could possibly do so.

Hull had set his heart on unity of action

at the conference,67 so, undaunted he called on the Argentine
,delegation headed by Saavedra Lamas.

65 Hull,
66

New

67

Hull J

Memoir~,

York

Time~,

lV~cr.1oirs,

He received Hull nervously

I, 326.
November 12, 1933, pt. 1,\20:1.
I, 327.

\,

'9
ut Hull outlined his plans and thereby appealed to the vanity of
.saavedra Lamas and asked his counsel as the head 0°! the Argentine
elegation.

Hull told Saavedra Lamas of his plan on two resolu-

tions, one pertaining to an economic program for business recover
and the other pertaining to the peace treaties.

Hull then pro-

rosed that Saaverlra Lamas should present the resolution to the
Iconference which pertained to the peace treaties and that Hull
'would present the economic resolution. ,He told Lamas that if he
did not care to propose the peace

resolut~on

that he would have t

find the next best man to do it.

After due consideration Saavedr

Lamas accepted Hull's idea and consented to propose the resolutio
acked by the support of the United States delegation.

68 This

cooperation between Hull and Saavedra Lamas was ffunexpected ff69 an
"in sharp contrast to Argentina's antagonistic attitude toward th
United States in previous confe~ences.n7Q
In the following quotation, tpe reader can readily
lunderstand the reason for Cordell Hull's triumph with Saavedra
Lamas and also the reason for the success of his Latin American
policy in general.
,

He wrote:

But I firmly believe in the principle that "there are
no real triumphs in diplomacy". I felt that true success

I1--------!

68 ill.sl. , 327-329.

69

~

York

.Timc~,
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\
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70 lli.Q. , December 10, 1933, 37:1.
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could come only by inducing our opponents to become our
allies through convincing them ~hat basically our ideas ~ere
their ideas. • •• I could have introduced into the Conference the peace resolution I had prepared rather than give it
to Saavedra Lamas and perhaps I could have secured a majority in its favor. But, h..ad I' done so, Argentina doubtle~s
would have fought it on some technical' grounds and the unanimity it needed would have vanished. I believed it ~~ser
in the circumstances for the head of the Argentine delegation to offer i t.·71
Commenting on Hull's mission to Latin America the
Chicagq Daily Tribune called it a "commendable official enterpris
and we are confident will result in improvement in our relations
with our South American neighbors.,,72 In the same editorial the
Tri~u~

noted the ability of Hull as well as his integrity and

,the sincere manner with which he attacked Whatever he undertook.
Again commenting on the Conference and the report of an
economic proposal, the Chicago Daily Tribune pOinted out that the
decline in trade between the United States and Argentina is a
considerable amount in dollars and cents.

It is pointed out by

the Tribune that bonds are defaulted by Latin American countries 7; which injures not only America~ investors but also the
iL~tin

!

Americans· themselves; their credit will undoubtedly be

..

jrestricted as a result of these defaults.
Ito conclude:

i

"If Mr. Hull nas a plan for reviving trade and can

i----71 Hull,
,1
,
I

112 : 2 •

The Tribune hastened

~~,

I, 331.
\

72

ChicagC? Dallz Tribune"
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put his plan into successful operation, he will rate a monument i
every Latin Americ~n capital as well as in Washington, D. C. n74
Saavedra Lamas

introduc~d

his peace resolution and in

accordance with their agreement, Hull seconded the resolution.
In his speech, he pointed out that they were writing a chapter in
the peace efforts of the Americas which would go down in history.
He also mentioned the policies of the New Deal and assured that
these policies would be strictly adhered to by the Roosevelt
administration. 75
On December 12th, Hull made his economic proposal on
trade revival and the reduction of tariff barriers through "the
negotiation of comprehensive bilateral reciprocity treaties based
upon mutual concession. n76 . Saavedra Lamas supported Hull's proposal declaring that Cordell Hull had put his finger on the
world's sore spot."??

This proposal o~ Hull's is rated by Wert-

enbaker as the "first positive United States
contribution in
,
history to the doctrine of Pan Americanism. n7 $
Harold Hinton in commenting on the work of Hull de-

-

74 Ibid.

75 Hull,

. '\ "....., co
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,

Memoi~,

I, 332-333.

76

~ ~ Time~,

77

Chicag.o Dai.l...~ News, December 13, 1933,

December 13, 1933, pt. 1, 19:2 •.
pt.~l,
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clared that the United States and Argentina had made a trade with
the proposals, as the United States had agreed to sUPP1rt the
Antiwar Pact of Saavedra Lamas in return for Argentine support of
Uni ted States economic leadership at the Conference. 79 If Hiriton
made this statement as a criticism of Hull's work, it hardly
seems to be a justifiable one in the light of diplomatic relations.
An editorial in the New York Times titled "American

--

Tariff Policy" said the Hull program looked to the future and

,!

must await a change in American tariff policy.SO

The editorial

pointed out the fact that the United States is attempting to
!

raise prices at home and any legislation dealing ,nth tariffs
will depend on the success of the price-raising program or the
inadequacies of such a program.

However, the editorial con-

cluded that the tariff policy of the United States is Changing.

S1

The resolution was adopted., In an Associated Press
re1ease$2 it was viewed as representing 'a change in the tariff
\

I

I

I

79

~ ~

80

~.,

$1 Ibid.

Times, December 13,1933, pt. 1, 19:1.:

December 14, 1933, pt. 1, 24:2.

$2 ~Associated Press 'supplies 1700 papers in the
jUnited States. Director~ of the Associated Press, privately
Iprinted, 1949, 10=15.
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olicies of this country. 83

Since no advers'e criticism accompan-

'ed the article it can be assumed that the
On December 19th a

spe~ial

cable

chang~was

acceptable.

for~,Montevideo

sent

by Harold Hinton told of the "'assurances made by Hull that the
United States was definitely committed to a policy of nonintervention in the affairs of the Americas.
thus:

The editorial concluded

"The declaration of a Chaco armistice and discussion of

a nonintervention resolution called up expressions of amity and
mutual respect such as no previous Pan American gathering has
seen."84
Hull along with others was credited with the Chaco

e

'

armistice. 5 In, another article of the same date, the ~ ~
Times pointed out that Hull came to Montevideo with a'definite
plan of action for well-defined organized peace.

Like a

~od

executive or a good Tennessee politician, he has quietly suggested all his plans to others and let
and take the credit. e6

I.

The'QPicago, Daily

~

th~m

introduce the projects

credited Hull with a diplomatic

IVl.ctory at the Pan American Conference that "not only constituted
•

I

j----------g-3---New
84

~ Time~,

Ibid., December 20, 1933, pt. 1, 1:3.

e5 Ibid., 15:3.
fi6

pecember 15, 1933, pt. 1, 2:2.
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a personal triumph but greatly improved United States relations
and prestige in Latin America. nS7 In its editorIal column the
J

same paper commented on the succ,ess of Hull's policies at the
Conference but added a note

of

warning that perhaps Hull's

phi~

0

10sophy on tariffs may be met with some misconceptions on the
part of our neighbors.

It reminded its readers of the fact that

the Congress of the United States shapes American tariff policies
.
SS
and not the Secretary of State.
The editorial concluded:
The United States deserves better esteem from its Latin
American sisters for its more liberal poliCies of the last
few years. It has done much to allay suspicion by withdrawing from Nicaragua and Haiti and other countries where it
had intervened on less provocation. By redefining its position on intervention and its interpretation of the !·1onroe
Doctrine, it has indicated a disposition to respect the
sovereignty of other countries. Such considerations should
,·,eigh against any disillusionment 1!hich may arise from misconception of the tariff policies. 9 . .
Arthur Krock wrote from Washington for the

~ ~

Times maintaining that nHull won his spursn·at Montevideo making
the President, Tennessee, and the Department of State proud of
him.

He went on to say that Hull has become the number one fig.

go

in the cabinet and a true exponent of the ,'alson policy ....

87

Chicag~
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New~,

December 27, 1933, pt. 1, 2:5.
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As the 'Secretary journeyed home he was warmly praised
by many of the delegations from Latin America as'· a real
maker and as the hero of Montevideo
the

~

Confe~ence.

.!2!!f Times from Panama City said:

peace~

A news item

i~

"Hailed by the local

press as the 'standard bearer of peace', Secretary of State
Cordell Hull of the United States, who arrived here this morning, • • • justified that designation. H91
The

~ ~

Times quoted Dr. L. S. Rowe, director

general of the Pan American Union in an article in February_

Dr. Rowe said the work of Hull particularly as a peacemaker, is a
very important contribution to Pan America.

He maintains that

Hull's efforts at the Conference ushered in a new era in our reIlations with the countries of Latin America.

Dr. RO,\'ie said:

I had occasion to visit these countries two weeks after
Secretary Hull's visits. Hull visited Brazil, Argentina,
Peru, Ecuador, ,Colombia, Panama and was deeply impressed
with the new attitude of friendliness, confidence, and cooperation characteristic not only of the government but also
of the people.

This feeling is that our relations with them are being
approached from a new and more liberal angle and that the
United States is determined that those elements of our policy which in the past have given rise to criticism are either
to be eliminated or fundamentally modified. The situation
is o?e f:ough~ with deep significance for the future of Pan
Amer~cam. sm. ';J

91

lb~~.,

January 8, 1934, pt. 1, 10:1.

92 Ibid., February 7, 1934, pt. 1, 6:5.
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In his Memoirs Hull points that the eyes of Latin America were,: turned toward us to see if we meant to, carry out the
agreement we had signed at Montev.!-deo as well as the policy of

'I

,

"

.~~-

the Good Neighbor.
Montevideo.

"We had reached a climax of cooperation at

Any faltering on our part now would revive old sus-

picions and antagonisms as acutely as before, if not more so."93
An Associated Press dispatch gives us some light on the
press in Lima, Peru.

The release is entitled "Press Lauds For-

eign Policy of Roosevelt". It points out that the newspaper ~
Icomercio 94 said Roosevelt's recent speech on foreign policy elos!es an irritating period
land other republics.

i~

relations between the United States

It will lend to\"lard "development of sincere

and useful understanding and postponement of suspicions originateq
by certain methods previously employed in American international

relations n • 95

The use of the word postponement is interesting;

apparently there seemed little hope tq postpone suspicion definitely.
Upon his return to Washington· Hull conferred with the
IPresident, then issued a statement emphasizing our diE::'.'\'o\'lal of

93
I
,December

I

i

94

31,

95

Hull,

~~,

I, 342.,

El Comercio, cited in Chi ca.go Herald and Excunincr,

1~0),
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"all the old themes of conquest or armed intervention,,;96 it became evident that solidarity of purpose of all the Americas could
be attained.
gainst us.

For the first time.there was no bloc working aOf course, ~here ~as not complete harmony at the Con-

ference but on all major issues there was a unity not found in
the Americas previously.
Bemis, an authority on diplomatic history, hailed the
Conference at Montevideo as a great advance in Pan Americanism,
"particularly in regard to the organization of peace in the presentation of which the nations of the New World had a common vital
interest."97

He also mentioned the resolution on the removal of

trade barriers, the treaties defining the nationality of women,
the requirements of naturalization in general, and the convention
defining the rights and duties of states as further accomplishments of the Conference.9~
Bailey said that this Conference
gave the Roosevelt.
,
administration the opportunity to "breathe greater reality into
its Good Neighbor policy."99 He concluded his remarks with the

96 Hull, Memoirs, I, 342.

i

iYnit~ ~~,

97

Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic HistorI of the
3rd ed., New York, I950, 764-

it

98

Ibid.
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i

99 Bailey,

piPl2~~t~~ ~orz,
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48 ,
observation that the Conference adjourned with "greater cordial'ty toward the United States than had'been
the six previous gatherings. nlOO

eviden~ed

at any of

An interesting note'--came from a Latin American, Luis
'Quintanilla who said:

"Hull. __ proceeded with utmost tact' and

kindness.

He succeeded first in dispelling suspicion and secondly in securing cooperation. nlOl Quintanilla went on to credit
Hull and the Roosevelt administration, feeling quite confident of

"

their policies as long as the Roosevelt regime continued in offie
out then brought up the question of What will happen with a
change of administration.

Quintanilla concluded:

"The answer'

rmPlies a faith in the United States, a faith which only time can
justify_

At any rate, that Conference at Montevideo was !
.
.
i n Pan Am eri can1sm."
.
"102
a turn1ng
p01nt

repeat~

Another view is expressed by Van Alstyn,e who commented
that the Roosevelt administration was determined
to make a realit)
,
out of Pan Americanism.

Pan American was to be the "chief instru \

ment of hemisphere defense."IO)

.'York,
i

We could not get anywhere with

100

Ib~.

101

Luis Quintanilla, A

102

Ibiq., 229.

1943,

159~160_

Lat~ America~

QEeaks, New

\

'

103 Richard W. Van Alstyne, Americnn D:Lplo!'1:1c\r in
2nd cd., Stanford University, Cun?:, r9JT;--2:!~r:--
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police action, a continued intervention might lead to intrigue
and cooperation in Europe, the only alternative was friendship.
In 1933 the Roosevelt

administrat~on

began realistically to fore-

cast the future and to appraise the practical need for Latin
American c,ollaboration in the face of possible foreign dangers. 104
The

~~ntevideo

Conference brought prestige to Hull and

praise from Graham Stuart.

He claims this Conference was success

ful because Roosevelt and Hull were
po1i~y

agr~ed

upon the Good Neighbor

and that the Department of State worked hand in hand

~~th

Mr. Hull to accomplish the objectives of the Good Neighbor policy
The Department of State had prepared Mr. Roosevelt's Pan American
-Day speech of April 12, 1933 wherein Roosevelt

his Good

def~ned

Neighbor policy "as possessing the essential qualities of a true
Pan Americanism, and defined the MOnroe Doct~ne as a Pan America
doctrine of continental defense. n105 Hull
had helped draft the
,
plank in the Democratic platform of 1932 Which advocated no inter '
ference in the internal affairs of nations.

Hull also had been

,Qble to secure some support from Roosevelt on the resolution on

!lovler
tariffs and abolition of trade restrictions.
•

Not only

iau1l accomplished these things but Stuart credits him ,..-1 th person

1-

104 Ibid., 229.
105

Stuart,

Q££artme~

\

2! State, 323.
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al endeavors to win over the delegations and especially the proud
arrogant Argentine delegates.

Stuart praises the'"astute manner

in which Hull won the cooperation ofdthe head of the Argentine
delegation, Saavedra Lamas.
Stuart .does not feel that Hull was well qualified for
the office of Secretary of State106 yet he concedes Hull's accomplishments thus:

"By submerging himself and the American dele-

gation in order to obtain wholehearted cooperative action for the
welfare of all, instead of personal prestige and praise, Secretary Hull made the Good Neighbor Policy a vital force for better
I

understanding. "107
According to Wertenbaker,

~~ntevideo

tore down our

interventionist policy of a hundred ten years' standing.

He com-

mends Roosevelt's backing of Hull's sta·nd on nonintervention and
tariff reductions by negotiating with·the other nations.

tfThis

stone-in the policy structure enhances,the Secretary's prestige
in Latin America at the expense of a good deal of criticism from
high-tariff advocated at home." 108

\,

Another reliable comment is made by Arthur \'lhi taker who

I, said:
,!

1106 ill..£., 310.
107

~.,

108

Wertenbaker, h. New Doctrine., •107.
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• • • the first important stage in the emergence of the new
inter-American cordiality came at the Seventh International
Conference of American States at Montevideo in 1933, when
the United States surrendered the right of intervention,
and18~e meeting ended in an ,atmosphere of friendliness.,.
• •
On December 28, 1933, the President addressed the
\'loodrow Wilson Foundation and acclaimed Hull.

In this Item 26,

t1peace by Peoples Instead of Vlar by Governments, ff he prai sed the
'i,:ork done at Montevideo and ended on a note of prai se for the
Secretary of State whom Roosevelt credits with bringing about a
friendlier atmosphere between the United States and our neighbors
to the south.

Roosevelt said:

"For participation in the bring-

ing about of that result we can feel proud that so much credit
belongs to the Secretary of State of the United States, Cordell
Hull. ,,110
Hull was satisfied with the backing he received from
Congress upon his return from Montevideo.

He was extremely

pleased with the rapidity with which legislation was passed in
Congress on the Chaco embargo, the Cuban treaty, Haiti, and the
Argentine Anti"rar Pact.

,Of

Cong~ess

Hull said that these concrete evidences

showed they were convinced of the "validity of the

,Good Neighbor Policy and the need to implement it ,'lith acts. nlll

I

II

i 1 C/.': 2
'-,'

,i

,

109 Arthur P. Whitaker, ed., Inter Americc.!1 Affc.irs,
York, 1943, 6.
._, :110
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What did Cordell Hull himself feel had been accomp,lished at Montevideo?

In an address before the National

in "lashington, he discussed this very ·point.
f

~

Pres~

Club

Fir.st of all he
1JI f

praised the people of Latin America for-their love of law, justice, and equality, for their courtesy, 'loyalty and kindness.

He

mentioned the inauspicious beginning of the Conference and the
pessimistic outlook held by many before the Conference began,
chiding the press somewhat by saying:

" • • • some of·my friends
of the press who were utterly pessimistic as to the outcome.r. ll2
Hull pointed out the suspicions, prejudices and aloofness; and
lack of concrete ,cooperation between the United States and Latin
America in previous years.

Hull claimed that the Conference

marked the "beginning of a new era--a new epoch--in this hemisphere."ll)

,

A new spirit inspired by the policy of the good
ll4
neighbor was born at MOntevideo.
International cooperation

twas demonstrated.

A peace revival wa~ conducted through the
;, entire proceedings. ll5 The trade and tariff steps were mentioned'

112 United States Department of State Press Release,
Some Results of the Montevideo Conference, Address by Cordell
RUl~, Series IB,-rublication No. 500, Washington, 1934, 2.

,
i
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L

113

Ibid., 3.

114

lliJ1., 4.

115 Ibi.d., 6.

\

53
with their possibility of international trade on a much wider
scope. 116 This sentence of the speech summed up the attitude of
the Conference toward these trade. problems:
• • • The Conference was --not content with a mere expression
of disapproval, but it proceeded unanimously to propose a
definite, concrete, and comprehensive program for economic
rehabilitation which would combine a policy of mutually
profitable international trade with such domestic economic
policies and programs as each nation may desire to maintain. 117

• •

Our next concern is with the problem of Mexico.

The

'situation is frought with a number of misunderstandings on our
part as well as on the part of our neighbor.

One has only to

,100 1

toack through the years to see evidences of intervention of one
\

116

!Ei£., 7.

117

Ibid., 10.

118

Hull,

Addresse~ ~ Statemcnt~,

\
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kind or another which would naturally arouse suspicions of us.

At times our choice of representatives. in Mexico had left much to
be desired and undoubtedly these representatives have been the
cause of some of the discord • .--.
General Lazaro C~rdenas was elected in 1934.
to

~,

According

,

Mexico prepared to inaugurate Cardenas and suffered "a

momentous change of heart, was thanking its stars for President
. 1 119 p .
.
Roosevelt and Ambassador J osephus Da~e s.
re~ous to the
Cardenas inauguration there had been some criticism of the appointment of Daniels to the post in Mexico because he had been
Secretary of the Navy at the time when the Navy bombarded Vera
Cruz in 1914.

~

said the change of heart on the part of MexiC;

was due to the fact that:
• • • In Ambassador Daniels they have found the weightiest approver of Mexico's radical and ,anti-clerical SixYear Plan. He had called it roundly "a nm'1 deal and a
square deal!" Roosevelt raised the price of silver. He has I
also recognized the Soviet Union, c8nsidered by Mexicans the
spearhead of all that is Godless.lf
The storm clouds began to gather over Mexico shortly
after the inauguration of C~rdenas. Commonweall21 said the relports

of an American newspaper man, who risked his life to bring

lout documentary evidence, indicated a new revolution was going on
i - - - - - l....1-9-"I-1eXiCO" , Time, XXVIII, December 3, 1934, 21.

I

120

I
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llli.

121 ltStorms Darken Over IvIexi co",
1935:" 271.

\
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in Mexico.

Bridges were blown up, trains delayed, tracks torn

apart--tangible evidences of the

and turmoil in Mexico.

urged its readers:

£o~~onweal

II

stri~e

• • • Everything that ca~_properlybe done by American public opinion should be exerted promptly and powerfully to
avert the outbreak of another civil war in Mexico--but if
those efforts fail, let it be remembered that no share of
the bla~~2for such a tragedy may be justly laid upon the
church.

I
t

I

I

/

The problem of recognition of the new Cardenas govern-

I!
\

!i

ment was discussed in America under the title, "No Intervention
in Mexico".

Representative Higgins of Massachusetts asked for

withdral'lal of recognition of Mexico.

America said:

Secretary of State Hull shows that he is not yet properly
informed concerning the real burden of our complaint: It
i
is true Mr. Higgins asked for withdrawal of recognition, but
even there Mr. Hull is not on firm ground, for one of the
conditions of our recognition of Russia is a promise to respect the religion of Americans in Russia, a thing "nich is
not being done in Mexico. l23
America pointed out that what American Catholics wanted
is a cessation of intervention, even
will not be withdrawn.

i~

recognition cannot or

The editorial pointed to the intervention

ist tactics of Josephus Daniels as .listed by the Brooklyn Tablet:
Daniels is guilty of recognizing Calles as boss; of praising
the National Revolutionary party which party was anxious to
expel all Bishops and priests; of entertaining the Governor

1?2
,

T

; I.: ~:lt'.nry

~.,

272.

123 "No Intervention in Mexico tt,
19, 1935, 342.
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.,
of Puebla who had closed the churches in Puebla; of calling
on Garrido Canabal, leader of the Red Shirts who are murdering Catholics, and praising Canabal. 124
America concluded:
Now all this obviously constitutes intervention of the most
efficacious kind. Mexico is not united behind the new pres-I
i dent and the country is aflame "Tj. th revo 1t. Every time l-'Ir.
Daniels comes out with one of his praises of the Calles
crowd, he is shouting to the world that he and his Government are supporting them. Every Mexican on both sides recognizes this instantly. Apd they are right. We call for a
stop to this intervention. l25
Since the United States had pledged herself to the policy of nonintervention, bmerica felt that we were entitled to demand that
intervention such as practiced by Daniels be stopped at once.
~

I

Sundal Visitor carried an article in which the

resolution presented by Senator Wagner to the Senate is discussed.'
The resolution demanded "that the United States suspend trage

re~

lations with Mexico and urge tourists not to visit that country
because of 'atrocities' against Catholics."126

This resolution

vms framed by the Knights of Columbus 9f New York who charged
"the Mexican Government is substituting atheism and communism for

~Christianity and slavery for freedom.~127

t

The Knights of Colum-

IbUSObjected to Daniels' actions in supporting the National Revo-

1-----i

I
I
127,

I

124

!2i£.
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1935, pt. 1, 1:1.
127 Ibid.
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lutionary Party of Mexico as well.
In an article in

~ ~

World, a report was made of thi
I '

denunciation of the persecutions in Mexico by members of congreSSi
It stated that precedents for

.~ntercession

the Congressional Record as well

a~

had been inserted in

a bill directing the Secreta!1

not to enter into any reciprocal trade agreements or understandings with any nation engaged in religious or

raci~l

persecu-

tions. 12 $
Senator Borah proposed a resolution that an inquiry be
Imade by the United States Senate regarding the state and Church
situation in Mexico.
IIIexican officials.

This was said to be an intrusion by some
According to the Chicago Daily Tribune these

officials felt that the Borah proposal was un\'lOrthy of consideration. 129 The officials of Mexico pointed out that such an inquiry would mean interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation; such an interference could lead to serious interInational consequences.

Despite the fact that Borah represented

,the sentiments of a large number of United States citizens it

i "does

not diminish the resentment here U;-lexicq] that Uni ted Stat

I
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authorities be requested even to. take consideration of any action!
°
"130
regar d~ng M.
e~can sovere~gnty.
o

America objected to the agitatiorx of the New

~

,;

and the World-Telew:::am over the.._proposed Bot'ah resolution.

Times

-Amer-

maintai'ned the reporting on the Mexiean situation had been
-iea
the poorest in modern times 131 and, therefore, the full facts in
the case were not

kno~m

to the public.

America felt that objec--

tions to looking into the Mexican situation need not be based on
a "mere legalistic point of international comity which forbids
2 Am °
t
o~nto wh at goes on ~n
•
'anyo
peer~ng
anoth er country. "13
er~ca
said:
The truth is that this Mexican question is an American
question, an American question of the most domestic kind.
• • • As a matter of fact, we think that Senator Borah • • •
has proposed a signal service to amicable relations with
Mexico, and all of Latin America, whose irritations against
us is growing, faster than is American irritation against
Ivlexico. A hush-hush policy will simply not work. The thing
has gone too far. 133
~

Sunday Visitor reported 09 the reply received by

!Representative Higgins of

~~ssachusetts

when he again urged the

recall of Daniels and that the United States withdraw recognition

130 Ibid.

-

1

I

~1935,

I

437.

131

"The Borah Resolution n , America, UI, February 16,

132

-Ibid.

133

Ibid.

~
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of Mexico.

Secretary Hull said:

" • • • it is not within the

, rovince or this Government to intervene in the
COe

sit~ation

in Mex-

n134 No comment was made by this paper as to the need for
!.l

intervention nor was any comment-made that the United States
Arguments were given by

should intervene.

't~e

Knights of COlumbuJ

to Mr. Hull that a warning should be given ,to Mexico that diplo!
'~atic relations would be severed unless persecution of Catholics
an Mexico was stopped. To this Hull again ans't1ered that he would
/3.dhere to a policy of nonintervention. 13 ;

r

During this period there was a demand for investigation,

~nterrerence,

~n
!

inquiry and intervention on the part of many people

the United States, Catholics as well as Protestants.

riShOP Curley condemned the

~ignoble

I

Arch-

silence of the United States,

[dth regard to the events in Mexico. n136

According to Archbishop

furley, it was estimated that over a million resolutions and
~etters had been sent to Roosevelt and Hull protesting the events

on Mexico. 137

Archbishop Curley accused'Hull of creating a new

eparture in American diplomatic practice when he refused to ex-

138 The Archbishop
a protest to the Mexican Foreign Orrice.
134

Sunday Visitor, February 3, 1935, pt. 1, 2:3.

~

135 Ibid.
~- 935,

136
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said Mexico is "not carrying out the part of the 'good neighbor'
lelationship, "139 as long as it adopts. a cours~ c~unter to ,the

consc~ence

IAmerican principles of fundamental rights of

and free-

dom of religion.
~b~

The Knights of Columbus wrote to ROOsevelt and Hull·
about the religious persecutions in Mexico.

In Roosevelt's orig-

inal letter sent to the Knights of Columbus he said:

"In respect

to the rights enjoyed by Mexican citizens living in Mexico it has

been the policy of this government to refrain from intervening in
such direct concerns of the Mexican

Gover~ment.

Inon-intervention I shall continue to pursue."140

i

That policy of
The Knights of

J

IColumbus ansl'lered sharply and reminded Roosevelt of his respondbili ties and denied that they sought intervention •• Instead the;.!
~aintained

they asked that the Government of the United States

remonstrate on behalf of those persecuted. 141

On the same point, the Catholic Dai1X

Ithe

Tribun~

reported

reply made by Roosevelt and stated:' Mr. Roosevelt made i t

,clear that his stand was not to be interpreted as evidence of inI

iiifference and reiterated his abhorrence of religious intolerance,

-

I~: 2.

.
139

fE..~o

1/1-0

Chicc;,g£ Dai\y ,lribune, December 1$, 1935, pt. 1,

141

--

Ibid.

---------61
whether here or abroad. n142
Commonweal 143 commented that ~ose~eltts ,. policy of nonintervention will comfort any nation which

or minimizes

d~nies

~

0

i

religious liberty.
~

.--

Brooklyn Tablet said that Roosevelt's stand on re-

ligious persecution in Mexico will "probably result in increased
vengeance, tt and the government there will ttprobably nOli feel free (
to go ahead and slaughter everyone seeking to worship Almighty
God. ttl44
Hubert Herring writing for the Chronicle

2! Worlq !!-

fairs maintained:
In the meantime, let the United States keep its hands
off. I would even express the hope that American groups
would deny themselves the rather dubious pleasure of protesting. It vdll do them no good, and it only serves to
complicate a situation which, I am convinced, will me~d if
£.'lexico is permitted to order her affairs in her Oi'm way.n 1 45
The New York Times l46 reported in April 1937 that a
-~

...

.......

possible obstacle to complete relationa of a friendly nature be-

l
142 Catholiq Daill

Tri~~~,

cited in the

November 19, 1935, pt. 1,

l/t3
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11t h

The Brooklyn Tablet, cited in Ibid.
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tween the United States and Mexico was removed when Secretary of
State Hull and Dr. Najera signed a treaty ,providing for the ter,

mination of Article VIII of the Gadsden Treaty of 1$53.

Thi~

ar-

ticle provided for the building of a plank and railroad across the
sthmus of Tehuantepec.
. ent of her sovereignty.

Mexico considered this article an abridg
In pursuance of the Good Neighbor policy

ChiCh strove to eliminate trouble spots, the termination of this
article pointed to, better and more amicable relations.
In January 193e, Hull protested the fact Mexico had fel
t::>bliged to raise international trade barriers just when other nations were finding it possible to lower them. 147 However, becaus
of Hull's policy of noninterference and amicable relations no rep
esentation of any kind would be made to the Mexican Government
i·mtil a complete analysi s of the decree had been made by exertso 14 $
An interesting article
.

.

appeare~

in the Saturday Evening

Post called "Revolution on a Silver Platter".

Commenting on

ICardenaS and his relations with Washington the article said:
Washington, embarking upon a still undefined policy of
being a "good neighbor", looked on social reconstruction
with a friendly eye; and this was of primary importance. It
is axiomatic in Mexico that no chief executive ;an long hold

l_ _
I

147

~.,

January 22, 1938, pt. 1, 2:8.
\

\,
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office unless the White House approves. This' has been prove .,
time and time again; in recent days during the terms of
Venustiano Carranza,. Alvaro Obregon, and Calle~. All these
men received ~fuite House support w~en they were in danger,
and all survived. The New Deal was not merely friendly to
Mexico; it went farther than' simply keeping hands off l·:erica
affairs. It embargoed arms for W9uld-be enemies. Later a '
new innovation, it bought Mexican silver at well over the
market price and Mexican metal generally, permitting pegging
of the pe so, gi ving Mexi co added purchasinf'"l... pO\'ler, and t~e
government 13 per cent of its totalincome:149
In commenting on the land grab
Mexico, the

~

\~ich

had taken place in

writer said:

Nevertheless, it may be that our State Department was
wise in adopting the attitude that the land program should
be encouraged and no immediate payment demanded for the
United States citizens' lands seized. In this connection,
Washington accepts the Mexican view that kmerican landowners
acquired their Mexican holdings on a shoestring and made big
profits for years • • • •

I

On the other hand, Washington could have slowed somewhat the agrarian program, or held it in safer bounds, by
protecting Unite~ States landowners Who have had vast holdings in Mexico.l,O
It must be remembered in dealing with this problem of

expropriations of oil and farm lands that the United States agree
to the right of Mexico to expropriate and that Mexico agreed to
our demand for compensation for properties.seized.

Despite the

impatience of those affected there was an amicable attempt on the
part of the State Department to obtain justice for those whose

149

Frank L. Klu.ckhohn, tfRevolution on a Silyer
Evening p~, CCX, February 5, 19J5~ 17.

C~~urday

150

Ib~i.,

710
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lands and properties had been seized.
The

~

writer added this comment on our diplomatic

olicy:
Where Washington appears to have fallen'down c"omp'1ete).y;
however, particularly from the viewpOint of being a "good
neighbor" to Mexico, has been in countenarrcin~, and even
encouraging, an intensified campaign against foreign industry. For many extreme steps that President Cardenas took
in this direction were followed by general laudatory speeche
by Ambassador Josephus Daniels. • •• His friendly speeches might have had a useful effect had they been followed by
an occasional bit of common-sense advice. They "lere not,
however · probably because of diplomatic policy set at
home. 1 5i

panies would be forced to pay royalties on all their properties

The Post noted the demands of Mexico that the oil com-

which upset the Morrow-Calles agreement guaranteeing the oil companies rights in Mexico. 152
The next step was the oil expropriations!

,

Cardenas signed a decree in November, 1936, which pror~ded

fO

for the expropriation of private property of public utility

satisfy collective necessities in case of war or interior up-

,:leaval.

i"~OOk

Actually the program to drive out the petroleum interest . .

the shape o·f most burdensome labor legi slation.

Tacitly thJ

Icardenas Government encouraged the labor unions to strike ab~inst

151 !£i£., 71, 73.
152
73.
\

\,
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the foreign o\v.ned companies for heavy increases in pay, shorter
'hours, double pay for overtime, • • • • n15 3

The labor

court~

up-

!held the unions on every demand and the foreign companies, a1IthOUgh costs had been driven to prohibitive levels, agreed to the
demands except those which dealt with the control of books and
management.
,

Because the companies refused to accept the complete

I

:demands, Cardenas decreed March 18, 1938, the expropriation of
their properties. 154
The Chicag? Daily ~, in discussing the oil expro-

I,'

priations, said the Secretary of State declared,forcibly that the
ltUni ted States intends to defend its citizens and their legi ti!!latJ]'
interests, in any part of the world, to the full extent allo\'led
by the limits of reason. n155

said:

In concluding the editorial the New

"The 'good neighbor' policy is undoubtedly admirable.

It

presupposes, however, that we have good neighbors. n156
The Chicag2 Daily Tribune featured an article written
Iby Arthur Sears Henning.

Ithe relations

betwe~

He said the 6il seizures have strained

the United States and ;'!c:d co.

jPointed out the United States did nO,t dispute the

I

Henn:Lrr::

authc~ity

,
of

"

153 Bemis, Latin American Policy, 347.
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Mexican Government to expropriate any properties within her boundaries, but we did demand just compensation.

Mr.

~enning

said

the crisis
• • • is not due entirely·to the expropriations of the American oil wells and refineries or to the previous action of
the Mexican government in raising the Mexican tax to a prohibitive degree on products imported chiefly or exclusively
from the United States. The expropriations of the oil
properties presented the United States with a cumulative
grievance, coming on top of the expropriations in the last
decade of hundreds of farms, ranches, and other agricultural
properties owned by Americans, few of them eI~~ have been
fully compensated by the Mexican government. )/

,Mr. Henning noted 'that the administration had done nothing but
make representations to Mexico on account of the "good neighbor"
policy until this expropriation of oil interestso

In other ''fords

the farmers and ranchers were not really supported in their
claims although Mexico agreed to compensation; very few claims
were ever satisfied. 158
The Chicago Daily

~

reported there was hope of

settling this oil situation amicably because of the neighborli-

,

ness which Cardenas showed in his message to the United States.

15 ·

The Latin American branch of the diplomatic corps was confident
160
a satisfactory adjustment according to the ~.

lor

!--------
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The Chicago Daill Tribune said editorially that "Mexico
has no reason to anticipate an unsympathetic response
.. in Washington to the seizure of the foreign owned oil properties. •
• • 161 The Tribune said the ~overnment here sanctions such ac162
tions and practices as for example in the case of TVAo
The Tribune also reported to its readers from its Wash-j
.i

ington bureau that the oil case will test the Good Neighbor poli-

cy.

The Tribune was able to point to the New Deal philosophy

saying:

"From motives not only of good neighborliness but of

sympathy with the economic and social new deal that President
Icirdenas is giving Mexico, Mr. Roosevelt declined to take the

',British course.

• •• He conceded the right of Mexico to ex-

Ipropriate the properties and early requested just compensation.

16

1

The article concluded that unless the Mexican Congress made a
nore impressive provision to compensate the oil companies than it
ldid to indemnify the owners of expropriated farm lands, the "good

neighbor policy will be badly bent.

And if Mexico gives Japan a

foothold in that country • •• , the question will arise whether
\Franklin Roosevelt's good neiehbor policy is as efficacious as
I
161

Chicag,2, Dailx

162

--

163

Tribull~,
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Mexico and that he has sent "skilled propagandists to canvass
tral and South America. n168 According to Newsweek o. the oil firms
and others with large holdings were alarmed and insisted the
lIState Department has invited ,this development by failing to demand restoration of oil properties as Britain has done. n169
The

York Times

~

~~iter,

Bertram D. Hulen, believed

Hull was proceeding wisely in suggesting arbitration of the oil
properties rather than using economic and diplomatic pressure to
force compensation. 170 Since arbitration is a fundamental principle of our foreign policy it was a wise move on Hull's part
despite the pressure that must have been put upon him by the
o

affected groups.
~eing

'

Hulen felt that the Good Neighbor policy was

tested very severely in this situation of the oil expro-

priations.

He ended his article:

"However, should misunderstand

ings arise that would lead to modification or virtual abanconment
of the policy, that would be considered a regrettable but unavoid
able consequence of the protection of ieg1timate American interests abroad."l?1

,

168 nC&rdenas Bids Latin America Expropriate Alien
Property," Newsweek, XVI, July 4, 193$, 13.
169

lllio

170

New

171
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Editorially the

~ ~

Times commented that Hull's.

vigorous note to Mexico on the expropriationfo should dispose of
Ithe charge that the State Department had been remiss in protecting American property rights in Mexi co .172
!

HoW€ver, the Times

,did not feel that the Good Neighbor policy demanded that we
abandon our interests abroad to whatever measures other countries
saw fit to use.
Delbert Clark, who wrote for the

~ ~

Times, said

that Hull's note to Mexico showed a firm attitude on the part of
the administration on the matter of expropriations and despite
the Good Neighbor policy it was necessary to forestall a wave of
lexpropriations throughout Latin America. 173 Hull had chosen to
stress the agrarian issues rather than the oil seizures because
the· "issues of seizure of relatively small farm properties
strikes a chord in the American breast. n174 Clark noted also
that "foreign policy at all times must have domestic support or
175
it inevitably falls."
Ecuador backed Hull's stand and commented on his note
,

/

,to Mexico in the nm'lspaper 1:elegrafo.

nIt is the duty of all

I

172 f.~i.cl· , July 23, 1938, pt. 1, 12:2.
173 Ibiq. , July 24, 1938, pt. 1, 3:1.
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governments to pay the full value of the property expropriated.
To act otherwise is an arbitrary abuse. of power. tt176
,.

The Chicago Daily Tribune noted that Costa Rica was
imi tating Mexican expropriations and, like News\,leek, the Tribune
tccused

C~rdenas

of promoting the idea of expropriations in other
!Latin ·American countries. l ?7 It regretted the fact that the inI

.

vestors who have had their holdings taken cannot use the promises
of compensation as cash.

In conclusion the Tribune added that

leXiCO could say that ttthe New Deal taught it how to deal with in
vestments. tt17 $

r

On August 26, 1938, Hull sent another note to Mexico del

~anding that Mexico
~proper

stop seizing American owned farmlands without

compensation.

This note was said to be the strongest this

government had sent in recent years according to the Associated
'~ress dispatch. l79
The lli!!!

:i

~

Times commented on the note in an edi toria
1S0
saying the note left Mexico ttwithout legal or moral support. tt

,

176
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, The paper discussed Hull's failure to mention the oil property
~mich

had been seized because he feared accusations of dollar di-

plomacy and imperialism.

The Times felt that .Hull should have

.

demanded the return of the oil property because it ·was quite evi-

Ident that Mexico was in no position to make compensation to the
oil companies for the properties seized.
The Chicago Daily

~

181

stated in an editorial, nA Warn-

I

ing to Cardenas", that if he continued his policies we would be
,rorced to abandon the easy tolerance of the Good Neighbor poli182
cy.

I

Hull sent another note of 5000 words to Mexico late in
August regarding the expropriations.

The~

threat nor could Uncle Sam be accused of bullying.

to save fundamental principles of Latin American policy, which in
eluded the principles of nonintervention and co-equality based on
an assumption nth.at each of the score of Latin American republics

'·.,<,ould guard the . .lelfare of foreigners within their boundaries as

p."3

United States preserves that protection. n-

L

'

!
181 Ibid.
182

Chisag£
1::"2~

Da~ Nei"~,

Ii

!

The Times fel ~

that Hull was condemning the Mexican attitude only in an effort

i

I

York Times maintaini

ed there was not a word in the note which could be taken as a

Ithe

I
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The efforts to settle the expropriations dragged on into August of 1939 when the

negotiatio~s

The New York

-

broke down.

Times said that there were three horns to the dilemma which confronted Hull on the Mexican
1.

.

si~~ation.

They were:

The Good Neighbor policy must not be allowed

~o

be viti-

I

ated by conflicts of commercial interest.
'.

2.

Latin American must not be encouraged to think the uniteJl

Istates will be unconcerned about expropriations.

I

3. European nations must not be convinced that they have ani
unwilling and feeble champion in the United States. 184

I

The Times felt that the administration would continue to follow

,

its present policy of trying to reach an amicable solution because the New World could not afford to be divided in the light
of the trend of world affairs at that time. l $5
It was not until 1942 that a solution was found.

\;nile

the compensation was not adequate, nor was its payment prompt,
the two countries were glad to settle the controversy because of
:the threat to hemisphere solidarity from without.

In reality the

United States practically paid for the expropriated lands through
the purchase of silver and stabilization of the peso and other
Iconcessions.

The New York Times said:

--

184

~.,

l:.~5

Ibid.

"This is a dangerous pre-
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cedent.

The best that can be said for it is that it terminates a

,troublesome controversy with a neighboring country,. at a time When
tit is of vital importance to maintain and strengthen relations
°
"186
.
WJ.• th La to~n Am er~ca.
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CHAPTER III

I',

THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM
Following Hull's return from
with his trade agreements.

~~ntevideo

he became busy

President Roosevelt was not too kind-

ly disposed toward Hull's trade proposal~ and philosophyl but as
time went on Hull sensed that the President was beginning to show
more interest in his trade philosophy.
As early as 1916 Hull formulated the philosophy of trad
which he tarried through his twelve years as Secretary of State.
He said in his autobiography:
But toward 1916 I embraced the philosophy I carried
throughout my twelve years as Secretary of State, into the
Trade Agreements, into numerous speeches and statements
addressed t~ this country and to the world. From then on,
to me, unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs,
trade barriers, and unfair economic competitions with war.
Though reali zing that many other factors \1ere involved, I
reasoned that, if we could get a freerflQ1..'l of trade--f:~ ':)r \
in the sense of fewer discriminations and obstructions--so
that one country would not be deadly jealous of another anc I
the Ii ring standards of all countries mi.:.;ht ri se, t!1creby
,
eliminating the economic dissati sfaction that breeds \13,r, we
might have a reasonable chance for lasting peace. 2

I,

I
I

Me~~~,

Q~2~~~?ent

I-----------I---H-Ull,
I, 353; also Stuart,
1;'3~~~e~ 322; a~so Charles A. Beard, Am~;ricaI1 .E.<2r_e..i_£l! Pol~c):
!;'.-:-"):..~' 19.>2-... 91~O, Nm'l Haven, 1946,10).
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No one can deny that Hull,:devoted much of his time and
energy to the study of trade; always he adhered
prosperi ty depends on stable

t~.

the same idea--

nation~ as wi!>ll as individuals.

i I
e

contended nany policy tending "to disrupt trade relations impairs
national security, leads to international misunderstanding and
'finally to war.")

Hull condemned high tariffs as a means of in-

ter!erence--a policy in direct opposition to his idea of noninter
vention.
Bertram D. Hulen, writing for the

~ ~

Times, dis-

cussed Hull and his political views on tariff and trade.

He

pointed out that Hull holds that "reciprocal commercial treaties
based on mutual tariff concessions and, as nearly as possible,
the unconditional favored-nation policy, if other governments will
ag;ree, would greatly supplement the usual legislative method of
tariff readjustment. n4
The

Chica~o

Daily

~

contained a well-written in,

ltelligent editorial in which was discussed Hullts trade policies •.
~

;'2:'he editorial said that the blame for the tariff situation must

,lbe

\

shared by both parties because they both joined in the log-

rolling.

I

j~

t

I

It pointed out that the United ,States is not the only

3 F;ed Hixon, nCord Hull:
History, LI, r·1ay 1940, 26.
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country guilty of economic nationalism; nearly all are guilty of
this same economic nationalism.

The only hope for ,. complete recov

ery lies in the resumption of trade according to this editorial.
Every nation must give and
terests of some producers.

tak~regard1ess

of the selfish in-

"The problem", said the

~,

"is to

discover the true national interest, and agree to admit such foreign goods as will not cause unemployment in this country, while
creating employment in important export industries through sales
lin foreign markets."5

All citizens, regardless of party, would

Icertainly

be glad to support such a policy as' this one.

l

On April 30th the New

I

!2r!

Times carried a report on an

I

'address by Hull before the American Society of International Law.
The subject was related to international economic

rehabilitation.~

IThe report in the Times did not speak adversely of Hul!'s remarksf
I

.

that the economic plight of the world was due to Trecor-ornic ..<{ar. tT

6'

Before the Conference at Montevideo he had proposed to
,

seek a trade pact with Brazil.

An Associated Press dispatch

,quoted the reaction of the newspapers
Ithe proposal.

The dispatch said:

~

I

Nacion and La Prensa on

"The newspaper

Naci~n

,

called

Ii agreement on monetary and tariff problems a decisive influence
5

£hica~o Qaily~,

6

l~~

April 11, 1933, pt. 1, 18:2.

York Times, April 30, 1933, pt. 1, 12:1
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upon Pan American economic unity.n 7 TtThe newspaper Prensa conceded that tpresident Roosevelt sees clearly that such unity can.tn8
not be borne without tightening cocrmercial ties.

'.
At the Montevideo Conference Hull proposed
that the excessive trade barriers be leveled to a reasonable degree.

He

.; urged that this be done by the adoption of
bilateral reciprocity treaties based on mutual concessions
to be entered into by nations of this hemisphere among themselves and others as well, and the second, by a proposed
understanding vd th other important countries that '-Ie and
they proceed simultaneously to bring down these trade
0
barriers to a level dictated by a moderate tariff policy.~

I·

I

On June 12, 1934, President Roosevelt signed the bill
knovm as the Trade Agreements Act,10 which was ~eally an amendment to the Smoot-Hawley Act.

The President was authorized to

enter into trade agreements with other countries without the need
of Senate approval or Congressional action.

!

i

Under this act the

!President could nincrease or decrease any of the Smoot-Hawley
rQtes by as much as 50 per cent in
Icessions from another country. nIl

,

ret~rn

for adequate trade con-

Reductions applied to coun\,

1933,

7

La Naci6n, cited in Q~fu~ pa~l.Y Tribun.~, November

8

Pre!'lsa,
-

pt.~~-i6:-1~

9

ci ted in Ibid.

Hull, 1.ddr.9sse~ ~ Statem~, 2$-290

10
11

I, 35$-359.
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tries that did not discriminate against us.'
Naturally Hull was overjoyed at the success
itter fight for lower tariffs and trade.

Jft~ long,

i

He firmly
?nd sincere,
1

Y believed that the "basic approach of, psace is the ordering of
, ,

he world's economic life so that the masses of people can work
nd live in reasonable comfort. nl2
The Department of State did a good job in explaining

Lhe program to the American people according to Graham Stuart. l3
members of the department gave addresses explaining every
)hase of the program and this publicity was helpful when the pro- t
gram came up for renewal.

The success of the reciprocal trade

rrogram was "a great personal victorY,for Secretary Hull over the
reSOlute opposition of isolationists, protectionists and New Deal
~rs, and in spite of the wavering support of an opportunist Pres-

'dent.,,14 Others called the trade program financially and econmica1ly unsound, because it would turn the, favorable balance of
trade to competing countries.
The first trade agreement was signed with Cuba in Aug\,

(st of 1934.

Our trade with Cuba increased noticeably--"exports

~o Cuba increased 129 per cent compared .;nth the last four months
12

I!?iS.., 364.

13

Stuart, Qepartm~g!

ll:_

~bi9:..

££ State, 318.

\

I'

.

,.----------_
........._--...
eo
of 1933 and our imports from Cuba increased 155 per cent. n15

The

favorable balance of trade going to Cuba.

I

In a special article by Harold Hinton from vlashington

for the New

~

nomic efforts.

Times, Hull is heaped with praise for his eco-

Hinton wrote:

o • • The present attempt at·negotiating reciprocal
tariff agreements, undertaken for the betterment of domestic
business conditions, is perhaps the only orthodox and con- I
servative plan which has taken place in the recovery program

• • • Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, whose quiet insistence on the possibility of outliving economic nationalism finally overcame the resistance of Raymond 11].01ey and
other advisors of President Roosevelt, speaks of the project
as a "step back toward economic unity." The eeonorr;ic sanity
to "Thieh Mr. Hull refers is the revival of foreign trade
which in 1929 enabled this country to sell $5, 0001000,000
worth of goods abroad. Mr. Hull believes 2,500,00u families'
could be taken off the relief rolls and put to gainful employment if that sliee of business were obt~inable today.l 6
An interesting editorial appeared in the ~ ~ Ti~es

entitled "Slow Progress".

It discussed the slow progress made in

negotiating the trade agreements.

By December 1934, twelve coun,

tries had been added to the list of those seeking to conclude
,trade agreements with the United States.

I

They included Belgium,

,

,

!

lS\veden, S...n.tzerland, Spain, Brazil, Colombia, and several Central

I

IArr:erican countries.

The editorial caustically remarked:

"It is

~

to see the list expand.
,~!)leasant
-

But it would be more reassuring

i

I,
I

15 Hull, i"1eE1ot~,
; ,::'.::1d t:~ c Uni. ·t.cd. Str\ te s. D+$

i
~

I
i
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to have the announcement of an agreement actually concluded_"l?
The editorial bemoaned the fact that by this date only one agree-

Iment had actually been concluded,

namely Cuba.

,-

No reflection is cast upon Mr. Hull by the

~

York'

iTimes, whom they grant, has worked untiringly and unwaveringly to

I

-

1secure the passage of the trade agreements but rather place the
blame on the manufacturers who protest the· lowering of any tariff. 18

However, the

~ ~ Times did not feel that it was the

ltime to abandon the plan and advocate a horizontal reduction of

I

lall duties.

This same paper concluded:

Iressed that the results achieved thus

i

~ingly

fa~

"But it must be conhave been disappoint-

meager particularly when it is remembered how long a time

has passed since the advocates of reciprocity first described the

~necessi ty of tariff reform as 'urgent' and 'imperative t

I
I

I

On December 23, the

~ ~

•

'9
t,':'

Times featured another

jeditorial discussing Hull and his philosophy.

The editorial said

Ithat Hull's ideas "would fall upon unwilling ears in the Con!gress."20 Concluding with this statement, the Times left no
I
Idoubt as to its regard for Mr. Hull and his tariff program:
I

17
18

Tb-:

r1

~.,

December 14, 1934, pt. 1, 22:1

Ibid.
--

19 .It:.tqe
December 23, 1934, pt. 4, 4:1.

\

\,

,

"

I

!

i

I
Above all, the Secretary deserves praise for singling
out ~he intimate connection between commercial freedom and
the abolition of dread of war. -He would app~rently agree
with the description of the word of Richard Cobden years ago
aiming at ttRetrenchment, Free Trade and Peace tt • This is
, not a worn-out shibboleth, 'but an aim and ap effort 'iqrthy
of the best endeavors of the ablest statesmen today. •
During this period there was little or 'no press coverag
on Cordell Hull's activities regarding Latin America and the trad

program.

The trend seemed to be toward editorial comment, favor-

.,able and unfavorable.

-

The-New
York
-- Times
........ especially followed the

progress or rather lack of progress on the trade agreements program.
It ran an editorial on "Tariff Bargaining" again berating the powers that were for their do-nothing attitude and tac
tics because of the pressure of powerful lobbies who sought to
keep tariffs protective in natureo

Included in this editorial wa

a discussion of whether business recovery was slow because of

itrade
restrictions or that business must
,
istrictions were to be lowered.

reco~.'er,

before trade re-

"To suggest that lower tariffs

}

imust wait upon recovery of business certainly seems to be the verr.,'
\,

(r"averse of the theory that the way to revive business is to lo".\"er',
I

ltariffs. ,,22
!

I

In February of 1935, there appeared a brief notice of

~---------

21 Ibid.
22

T' ••

~.,

\
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signing of the ,trade pact with Brazil.

II

The report was that

Brazil hailed "with satisfaction and relief' • • • the news of the

.

conclusion of the American Brazil, trade treaty. n 23
The Chicag£ Dai!y Tribune also took note of the Brazil
trade agreement.
~'ttri ting

In a special article by Arthur Sears Henning,

from Washington, he contended that the Roosevelt tariff

policy was being put to the test because Hull was "aggressively
pushing negotiations of reciprocal foreign trade agreements and
American manufacturers are protesting in increasing numbers against the withdrawal of protection. n24

Henning added that the

conclusion of the Brazilian pact had seemed "to reveal in bold rei
lief the methods by which Mr. Hull aims to impel other nations to
!

'

remove barriers to foreign trade."25

Mr. Hull had refused to re-

veal nations on the so-called black list and, therefore,

\~ould

not benefit from the new pact.
The

~ ~ _T_i_m~e~s

defended the 'Brazilian pact as even

the "most stalwart protectionist need not take alarm"

Inew
f~~ri th

26 at the

pact because the articles included are not ones in competitio
our

O\'ffi

products.

The editorial raised the point of the

23

Ibid., February 4, 1935, pt. 1, 6:3.

24

ChicagQ,

25

Ibid.

26

N~ ~

Dai~ Trib~,

February 5, 1935, pt. 1, 7:1.,

Time,s, February 5, 1935, pt. 1, 1$:2.

••

...

most-favored-nation principle maintaining this principle cramped
our opportunity for tariff bargaining.

The

~ ~

Times said

the treaty is extremely limited ~n range but hoped
with Hull, ~ho
,
described the pact as "the fi~st break i~ the log-jam 6f international trade," that it will be the for<erunner of other pacts. 27
The

Chica~

Daill

~

also commented on the Brazilian

pact bringing out the fact that in the days after vlorld Vlar I,
markets were not a problem.

It was easy to sell our products.

But the depression days were hard on our producers and, therefore
hard on all the people.
gent manner.

icalone.

Markets were sought "after in a most dili

The editorial said the

The

~ felt

r~cipocity route

II

was the lOgJ

that this pact was more significant than

'the Cuban pact because it did not involve political consideration

I

and the products to be admitted did not seriously compete ,Yith ou
,own products.

The conclusion was noteworthy:

". • • the Brazil'ian pact deserves the publicity it has received. But the reciprocity process is regrettably slow, and the middle west,

~nich

Ihas a large stake in the revival of foreign trade, hopes it may b
,\!accelerated. "28
I

There was some criticism of the Brazilian pact because

L~ the manganese ore included in the tariff concessions.

I'~'~

Some

27

~.

I'

I

l

\

:-

February 8, 1935, pt. 1, 18:2.
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critics objected to Hull's policy on account of these concessions
Ito Brazil and particularly the one pertaining to t);).e ore'.

The

,New York Times wrote an editorial commend;ng 'Hull's reply to his

I~t : :

Istorm

They maintained reducing a tariff would bring about a

tl

of protest from those manufacturers of the article and has-

I

tened to add:

It is, then, time for the officials responsible for the I
tariff-reduction policy to stop talking generalities and to I
point out as Secretary Hull has nOVi done, exactly how the
specific duty on the specific article has been at the expense of all the rest of us as consumers, and by the retaliation it has caused. It is also a good time to point out
ho'\"l those in the protected industry itself are taxed as consumers for every other tariff, and even injured as producers
by the general disorganization which an extravagantly high
tariff policy brings.29
The Louisville-Courier Journal commented on the recip·rocal trade policies of Cordell Hull as the most' logical step
toward harmonious international relations. 30 They agreed with
Hull's thesis that the promotion of normal trade was the natural
way in which to promote peace. 3l
The Chicago Daily Tribune was cited in the

~ ~

Times for its kind remarks about Mr. Hull's policies.

According

,

to the editorial Mr. Hull was "one of the few men in Washington

29

Ne~l Yo~

Times, February 12, 1935, pt. 1, 20:2.

30 lhpll~i~_yJ;,11~-Qo;~e..£ Journ.91., cited in the Ne\1 York
1, (5:6.
-

April -J, r:U~, pte

31

~.

\

\
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whose activities are calculated to produce an economic recovery. tt 32
,.
I

The Cleveland Plain Dealer said that Hull had

'

~rork~d

consistently to overcome the harm done by the ,previous ad~inistrations. The Reciprocal Trade Act made it possible to lay the
foundation for increased trade with several smaller nations but
the restrictions of the Smoot-Hawley policy hampered trade with
the leading nations to which our exports were heaviest and from
,which we must expect our heaviest imports. 33
On the anniversary of the Reciprocal Tariff Act, 'the'
I~

York Times editorial staff contended that the program was

still in the experimental stage.
of consequence was
!

th~

They maintained the only treaty

one ;concluded with Brazil but 'ihich had

not been put into operation because of opposition in South Americ
and also because the Brazilian Congress had failed to approve the
measure thus far.

The Times maintained the failure was due to
J

the most-favored-nation principle and als,o to the "unyieldinG opposition of most groups of American producers to any increase in
imports."3£;

: :,.pril 21,

Despite the efforts of Hull to sell the people the

3 2 C~i cago Da:i.. 1 v Tribune,
1935:-pt. -4,-8:b~ W'
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33
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idea that we must ,buy abroad if we hope to sell abroad, there was
~this

opposition on the part of the producers to r,educe

'any item mentioned.

tariff~

on

As soon as the tariff on any product was spe

cifically mentioned as the one to be reduced there

"IlaS

"

a storm of

protest and a wild scramble to lobby against such reduction.
ISUCh opposition was partly responsible for the limited number of
Itreaties which have been concluded; those vmich have been conclud
ed had faced just such opposition.

I

,For some time there seemed to be no interest in the
trade program on the part of the press, as no articles, or editorials appeared in the papers.

The interest was resumed by the

ipapers with the, opening of the 1936 Presidential campaign.

Dur-

'ing this campaign the tariff program became a very vital issue.

-

-

The Raleigh News and Observer
reminded its subscribers
.;;..,,;.;;,,;;;...;.;;;....;..;;.;.;;..
that the Republicans had proposed the Smoot-HarTley Tariff Act as
a cure-all for the depression.

I,

As a remedy for'this unhappy fail
~

ure Cordell Hull's reciprocal treaties came into being
the rumblings of the protectionists.

The

desp~te

~ ~ Observe~

"Trade has been set free, men have been put back to work.

I

said:

,.

A sub-

stantial beginning has been made in recoverin,O;: that international

Itrade
',c,

1tlhich was all but destroyed behind tariffs v;hich r;'.orc ef-

I'

fecti vely strangled industry than protected it."3 5
\

cited in the Npw York

f

I

.

'

ee
The Chicago Dailz Tribune slapped the administration
tariff policies in an editorial, nTariff by Dictatbrs n • 36 The
occasion was a speech by Dr. Robert Lincoln O'Brien, a Republican
o

o

$

from Massachusetts, who expressed approval of the reciprocaltrad
,.,

treaties.

He went so far as to say he was going to urge the Re-

publican convention to adopt a plank to perpetuate the new tariff
making policies which Mr. O'Brien happened to discover "vastly
preferable to the old log-r~lling method.,,37
agreed with the findings of Mr. OtBrien. 3 $

The T!'ibun~ dis-

It reminded him that

the tariffs were not arrived at by impartial, expert study,rather the very opposite is true.
The fact is, of course, that they are made by politicians in the executive branch of the government instead of
politicians in the legislative branch. • •• P~. Roosevelt,
like others ~dth dictatorial aspirations, has no use for
scientific detachment. He wants what he wants and he means
to have it. To him the great virtue of the reciprocal
tarifCfJ arrangements is that he can mal-ce them. He can accept the recommendations of his experts if he wants to, but
he is under no necessity in the matter. He c.::m use his control of tarifff]s to reward the faithful and punish his opponents. If the tarif(fJ commission will not approve of his
plan he may seek means of winning them over but if h~9fails
he still can ignore the recommendation and go ahead.)

36

Chicago

Dail~ Tribun~t

\,

April 20, 1936, pt. 1, 12:2.1,

37 Ibid.
38

r·'Ir.

0 'Brien ',las the chairman of the Urli ted States

Com:n~ S5].011.

39 Qhi s.~s.?. 12D.:' 1y 'Iri l:mnc, April 20, 1936, bt'~ I, 12: 2.
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The writer has found no evidence to support this thesis
of the Chica,go Daily'

Hull does not mention this dic-

Tribun~.

tatorship on matters of tariff
of the other wri ters which

polici~s in~is

1tlere

Memoirs nor do any

consulted •. ·Since Hull does men-

tion other disagreements with Roosevelt's policies, and since the
tariff situation was one of Hull t s chief interests", it seems logi
il

cal that Hull would have mentioned such dictatorship had it existed.
In the New York Times an article was found in which

-----

Chester Davis, Agricultural Adjustment Administrator, said the
farmers had benefited from the reciprocal trade program because
the "income from agricultural exports to eight of the thirteen
nations which we have such agreements increased 15 per cent over
that of the corresponding period of la.st year, as against 5 per
cent for nations not having agreements. n40

Since the farm group

opposed the agreements, this statement, is important as it was
uttered by the Agricultural Adjustment Administrator.

I

--

The New York Times again defended Hull's treaties.
-....-......

-----

\ ,

IThis time they defended the treaties on the grounds that, despite
Ithe cries that irr.ports were flooding the markets, the fact re-

!mains

that fourteen treaties have no'tl been concluded yet, "our

I
\imports for the latest month reported are less than half those
~

\

40

May 2?, 1936, pt. 2,
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,
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for the comparable month of 1929, when the Republicans themselyes
were in power. n4l At the same time our exports were increasing
)

which was exactly what Hull had hoped for in his plan.
The Ciqcinnati.

Eng,uir~

sa\-T in, Mr. Hull's defense of hi

treaties the opening gun in the 1936 campaign as far as tariffs
were concerned.

The

En~uirer

felt that Hull had conducted his

reciprocal trade program "not as a Democrat but as a public servant.

There had been no hint of partisan bias or favoritism in

making of these admirable treaties. ,,42

,
I

The Chicago Daily Tribune was happy to print a report

by Arthur Evans on the attack upon

I

Mr. Hull and,his trade treatie1

by Congressman-Francis D. Culkin of New York.

Culkin accused the I

State Department by saying "they have placed the northern farmer
on the 'good neighbor 'auction block t ."43

Culkin added to this

that all the proceedings of the treaties were carried on with the
greatest secrecy and maintained the "whole procedure was a clear
violation of the principles of popular' government. n44 It was not ·
,difficult to understand why this article appeared while others of

I

ipraise were left out of the pages of the

Tribun~.

I- - - - - - - -

II

41

42
; August 2, pt.

~.,

July 20, 1936, pt. 1, 14:1.
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Enctuirer, cited in the
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Times,

43

Chicago Dail.l Tribune, October 8, 1936, ~t\. 1, 10:2

44

-Ibid.
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During the 1936 campaign, Governor Alfred Landon asi

sailed the trade program and in an Associated Press Dispatch Hull
answered the criticisms made by Landon.

Hull asserted there haa

been a rise in exports since --the trade treaty program began and
thereby justified his faith in the program.
quote:

Hull was glad to

"From a level of slightly over $1,600,000,000 in 1932 and·

1933 our exports rose to over $2,280,000,000 and continue this
year on the upward trend. n45
The Chicago

~ilX ~

denounced the Roosevelt adminis-

tration because the dollar had been devalued and, therefore, our
dollar bought less than it did before.
i

10d:

"Foreign trade is a swap.

The conclusion was pointI

If we do not buy, we cannot sell. t

No wonder our foreign trade under the New Deal, has reached a new
lowl "46
William L. Clayton, said to be the world's largest cot-

iton merchant,in an expression to the
.

~

~hattanooga

Times, said that

(Secretary Hull "has patiently and unswervingly stuck to his principles.

A vote for President Roosevelt is a vote to keep Secre-

\ ,I

tary Hull in office, where his work, just beginning to bear fruit,

1--I
I
I

,

45

9:.ic C':.G2.

46

~.

Pc.ilZ~,

October $, 1936, pt. 1, 9:4.
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may go forward with infinite benefit to the nation and to the
world. ,,47

Mr. Pfeiffer, the head. of Importers and Traders, defend
ad Hull's policies on trade. "Pfeiffer said:

The Roosevelt administration through the efforts of thal
far-sighted statesman, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, has
taken the lead in a determined attempt to prove that many
supposedly necessary tr2de restrictions can be safely reduced, if not entirely eliminated, by carefully prepared and
intelligent cooperation between nations, and thatnfew if' any,
legitimate interests need suffer in the process. 4o

-----

The New York Times again came to the front ,dth an editorial agreeing completely with the stand of the Foreign Policy
,Association

~mo

maintained the gradual

~emoval

of tariff barriers

could not be resisted by those who objected to Government intervention in business.

The Foreign Policy Association described as

inconsistent those critics of the administration who denounced
,regimentation and at the same time denounced Hull's policies on
trade.

The Times approved this attitude of the Foreign Policy As

sociation and concluded with:

"The surest road to 'regimentation"

is to propose a policy of extreme economic isolation.

The best
\,

,antidote is the one urged by Mr. Hull:

the development of foreig

!markets to absorb the domestic surplus'es. ,,49
I

!

!

I
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Harold Hinton 50 in a special cable from Buenos Aires
~said

the Hull trade policies met obstacles since

leign trade was greater than all of
~ncluding

Brazil.

t~erest

Ar~entinats

for-

of ?outh America, not

Argentina's'-example had great influence accord

kng to Hinton and her slogan was "Buy from those who buy from uS."i
raturallY such resistance to the Hull program was trying .men he

iwas

meeting resistance here at home at the same time and especial-

ly in the light of his efforts to secure the friendship of the

I

countries to the south.
The year 1937 brought a problem to the front because

/

i

i

the Trade Agreements Act was to expire in June.

I

ant to see his pet project thrown into the discard pile and so he

!

I

Hull was reluct-

promptly began to plan his fight for the survival of his beloved
program for another three year period at least.

He was well a-

,n
I

ware of the fact that the program had been one of the controversial issues of the 1936 campaign and that the fight for extension
would be an out and out struggle to save the program.

He felt

that the program was worthwhile and the records showed a marked
increase in the trade of our country.
,House

Co~~ittee

and prepared a statement for the Senate Finance

,COT:...-r': ttee in 1::hich he defended the treaties and urged their ex-

I

ltcnsion.

\,

Hull appeared before the

I'

The opposition from the cattle, ~)'ool and copper states !

!

\

50

L~.,
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exceedingly bitter. 51

The Con~ress10nal Record shows the bit-

struggle which took place during the hearings .·for there are
countless pages of argument and

d~bate

on the matter.

The exten-

sion was passed by a considerable majorityvfor another three year

I

eriod.
In 1938 the trade program of Hull was ..adopted by the

Americas at the Pan American Conference held in that year but
l'lhitaker, Chicagg, Dail;r

~

correspondent, warned that:

JOhnl

"This

Iforward step has the weakness, like everything else done at a con
Jference of being a mere resolution of,words and paper but Hull
~means

to give it concrete reality by vigorous persecution of bi-

lateral trade treaties. n52
Nothing of consequence appeared in the newspapers until
late in 1939 and early 1940 when the battle began again for a re'ne;'la1 of the Trade Agreements Act for another three year period.
The fight \'las a long and hard one and ,again the opposition came
'from the cattle, wool and copper interests.

The matter was dis-

tcussed at great length in the House nnd the Senate.

~~ny

of the

editorials and opinions which ,d.ll be quoted appeared in tho Con(;rcssional Record e.s the ne'!:lspapers the writer was able
\.-~

\

II
•. I

;did not feature any too much material as by this

pc~~od

I
51

Hull, Mem9irs, I, 519.

52

9p~cn~2 ~~~~,

\
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more interesting struggle was being reported in the news because
of the European situation.
The

Knickerbocke.£~;

an independent Republican paper,

said the American farmer and manufacturer cannot be displaced in
the world market despite the cheap labor of some of our competitors because we can deliver the goods needed in the world market.
This newspaper reminded its subscribers that the trade across in:Iternational borders as well as the trade wi thin a country provide"
more business, more wealth, more jobs and more prosperity.53
The Reg! ster, independent paper of Des Iv10ine s, Iowa,
Iwarned the farmer to look back into the early 1930 f s before deI
'serting the trade agreement program. 54 The Regi,ster, independent
Democratic paper of Mobile, said the nation must resist the opposition to the trade program because "the country's national wel'.Care m';.lct not be subjugated to selfish private interests. ,,55
The Chicago Daill Times exhorted its readers to support
,

the trade program because it was very elementary economics--one

Ii

53 Knickerbocker News, Albany, N. Y., November 11,
1.939, cited int'il3'-ConFfrmiona"'I Record, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess.,
.'-;:'o:('uary 19, 191y O,
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must buy from foreign countries if we expected them to buy from
.

The editorial berated the selfish interest~ of manufactuters

us.

I

and producers who were fighting the program, as well as the Sena'
,

tors and Representatives

-who put

".

','

,

the interests. of their constitu-

ents above the i·nterest of the nation.
~

The editorial concluded:

nSecretary Hull has patiently been obliterating the traces of the
tariff mess of the 20's.

For the first time the tariff problems

are being handled honestly and scientifically. • • •

It would be

a political and economic crime to go back to the scandalous meth-

ods of Smoot-Hawley days.n 56
The C.incin.Y'/,ati !nguirer said the
~

.

tr~de

agreements have

,

had raults but they ha".,e been a big. step forward fro!D. the logrolling tactics of former days.

They represented na most import-

1ant, contribution to world order. ,,57
Hull made a speech before the American Farm Bureau Federation in which he maintained "prosp,erity can be achieved only
in a world which is at peace.

Hope of enduring peace among na-

In its usual hysterical fashion the .Chico~o
Herald
- ....

,

57,

.c!-.:!?:c.:i.pn~t1:. ,]!;E,qu:~E,c1:,

58

Chicago

~ f2E:.lS.~C?.~s5.on:~...... ~(;C01~~, "lvt~1 (;ong.,

November 29, 193 9~ c1 'ted in
3rd Sess., 1940, 1638.
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IAmerican cited that part of the address and hurried to protest

•

"We will NOT regain American prosperity through any indirect and
fatuous attempt to make all the REST of the world
first.

We can do it ONLY by thinking of

M~RICA

prosperou~

FIRST AND At-

'IWAys_n60 There were several other editorials and comments in the

1------ --_. . . . . .- .; .,; .; ; ,.; .; ,;
Chicao Herald American

~~itten

in the same vein.

They repre-

sented such poor opinion and attitude that it seemed foolish to

j

!h!

Tim~

of Bayonne, New Jersey, maintained those who

were endeavoring to destroy the trade program were the very ones
~mo

had guaranteed prosperity under the Smoot-Hawley program.

!They

b~cked

up their contention by pointing out the 50 per cent

I,rise in our export trade of farm products' to
i~ries

I

\'lhile the farm exports to other countries \·:hich did not havl""

!

I

',

trade-agreement counl

!

59 !.ill.
60 !"bi,:+'_

I
\

I
!
.,

i
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trade agreements
The

~dth

~

.
61
us declined slightly_

York Times said to abandon the trade agreement

•
policy woul.d be a blow at peace ?ond international
cooperation"
.-

but to renew the program would

nreasse~t

I

..

our faith that nations

are not mere competitors in a ruthless struggle for markets, 'but

,

mutual customers dependent on each other • • • • n

62

The Oregon Journal, an independent Republican paper,
suggested a worthwhile consideration to their readers.

nFacts,

not emotional prejudices, the whole rather than the partial effec
of the Hull agreements should determine their fate_ n63
Tim~

had a few comments to make on the situation of

Hull's trade agreements.

They mentioned the selfless devotion of

.Hull to his program and his refusal to consider himself a candi-

(i~;.:.,.;

.>;)J.' -:;"lO

Fresidency. 64 ~ carefully ~:;:

stacked up for Mr. Hull's program in a favorable manner despite
the opposition's charges that farm imports
had risen in the year
,
1937. [1935 a~d 1936 were the years of the drought and this ac-

I

counts for" the increase in farm imports ~ ~e article closed

. --

I

61 !~ !t~~, Bayonne, New Jersey, December 5, 1939,
i ci ~ed in the £Q£;J~!:.~:s..9J..on€J. Rcco~, 76th Cong., 3rd Sass., 194-0,
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.
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December

19. 1939, pt. 1, 22:1.

~2:eEo~6{~q~~~~, January 8, 1940, cited in. the
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with this interesting observation:
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•

"But over the years Cordell

Hull showed staying po.."er, and gradually Franklin,·Roosevelt became a Hull man, carrying out Hu+l doctrines whereas nowhere was
Ithere any evidence that Mr. Hull was a New Dealer. n65
. Newsweek wrote of the trade program in much the same
manner

as~.

It, too mentioned the·fact that Hull had sacri-

ficed the possibility of being nominated to the office of President but preferred to stay with his trade program.

It also cited

figures and facts to back up the program. 66

Ithoughts

I

These editorials and comments give some idea of the
expressed by the press in the campaign for the renewal

of the Trade Agreements Act.

1but only by a small margin of
from the news.
of

~lorld

The Act was renewed for three years
fi ve votes.

The big news in all the papers was the progress

War II, and once we had entered the conflict, the war

In8ws was of major importance to the press.

By January 1, 1943, twenty-five reciprocal trade agree-

\.

ments had been negotiated, sixteen of those were with those of

,

; co'.mtri e s
j

Bailey in cowcenting on the Trade Agreements

I

said:

I

!

'-------65

_.. 91,0
h._,

i"1

~

I

66
1.+' -1__S ..

~.,
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it is difficult to determine the economic consequences of

It • • •

ithe program but it has unquestionably done much 'to improve int,er- '"

8

f

.

~ational good will, especially w.ith the Latin American coun-

,--

tries. "67

.

'.

Bemis said the Hull program on trade 'became known as thei
· ew Reciprocity and also the cornerstone of American foreign POli-1
y when the United States became a full belligerent in vlorld viar

· I. 68

Sumner Welles, in his latest book, Seven Decisions

~

(Shaped History, said Y'Jr. Hull failed to realize that even his

rr~de agreements
~r~ng

could not turn the tide against the dictators an'

peace to the world.

atter:

Welles presented this thesis on the

"But no matter how beneficial a liberal economic regime

ight have been in more normal times, after 1936 no economic reme
dy could have dissipated the military threats that confronted all

the democracies. n69
It is difficult to evaluate the Trade Agreements Act be

I
,

j

cause of the abnormality of the times during World \'lar II and in
,the period of unrest which followed in the world after the war an'
•

I~ .••
",~__
........

,,
i

c\.... 1.

pClr""~sts
'C
t.:,)_

lvaluation,

even today.

Regardless of tho

i~poGs~~~lity

';;he Trade Agreements Act ~1as extended for

another threE'j

I~~:

of e- \

\

\,

101
year period in 1945.

~tr.

Hull

w.~o

Needless to say the action greatly pleased

had resigned from the Cabinet.

active in the work of the

gover~ment,

Even. though no

longe~

he continued to write and

watch his pet dream continue-tn its work of fostering economic
good will. 70
70

Hull, Memoirs, II, 1721.
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CHAPTER IV
"

ARGENTINA
9,

Argentina has presented a difficult' prOblem in attem;t;

I
,

This problem arose from several

to secure hemisphere solidarity.

factors which need to be taken into consideration in discussing
that country.
Argentina is a country more like the United States than
any of the other Latin American countries.

Its climate is simi-

lar to our own; its products are similar to ours.

Because of a

favorable climate she, like the United States, has developed to a
marked degree in comparison

~dth

cov.ntr'j~

ileader of South America.
en to Brazil.

her sister republics.
•1

Argentina

".' .... !"\

~ ~ -.!! ,..>~,
-, ' , ""...

~,.

She is jealous of any help

~,.

.
.
\Hll. C.l l. S

J
~

,!
'

gl. V

,Argentina's populationi s mostly of European ori,

?

gin and she still looks to Spain and Europe culturally,N and her
economie life is tied in very closely with that of Great Britain
\,

!

19~!~~Z'

1 Carlton Beals, "Argentina vs United States, ",Cu;:~
L July, 1939, 28. See ~lso Clarence H. Haring, £?~

I~erica baok~ ~ ~)!.-~. Y.D:l.t~~

I

I
,,.

2

~':hi te,

,States, Ne\·[ York, 1929, 194-195.

Arp;entina,
_
.............

-....--

62.
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t-

and Europe.)

This economic relationship with Great Britain and

Europe is due to the similarity of products of the United States
and Argentina.

It is due, too, to our past.

.

tariff~

.

.

.

.

pplici.es ,'tlhich

have kept Argentine products "'out of the United "Stqtes in the name
of protection, protection of American products.
There has been a feeling of dislike and distrust to\>lard
·the United States on the part of Argentina.

This feeling dates

back to the year 1824 when Argentina was the first South American
country to recognize the MOnroe Doctrine; she sought to base her
foreign policy on collaboration with the United States and the
Monroe principles. 4 Since the United States did not encourage
this move on Argentina 1 s part, ill-feeling was created.
with this fact was th~ 'Falkland Islands situation.

Along

The United

; States fC'.:tlr:-d to uphold Argentina 1 5 claim to the Falkland Isl<?nds
,-

when they were occupied by Great Britain and

agai~

ill-feeling

was created by our failure to recognize her claims during the cerl
tury of dispute with the British.
And there was beefl

Under an act of 1$90 the United

States Government had full authority to prevent the importation
of infected cattle and sheep into the United States and in 1903
the authority was extended to include meats, hides and other ani- ,

3

Ib:.(~.

\

257.
!_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -J.

,

r;~r-!-'"- - - - !
I

!

I

lcal products.

Tne reason for these restrictions was that hoof
'I

,I!

!:nouth disease was prevalant in many countries and.. especially 'in
Argentina.
Argentina has always held this restriction on meat and
meat products against

us~

She has felt that the hoof and mouth

disease was used as an excuse to keep her meat out of the United
States when the truth of the matter has been, in her eyes at
least, that we just did not want her meat and meat products in
competition with our own.

There is some justification for this

,contention since there are parts of Argentina where hoof and

•

mout~

disease is unknown and since the canned meats were also refused
admittance to the United States it does appear to be hard to explain the situation.
Sumner

~'Jelles

claims our record in this re-=::ard

5.~

I

'black as it is painted, yet he says t'le cannot justify our

not

a[:'

att;i~:ld€:.\

on canned meats because our tariffs were uniformly high; nor can
our attitude on tariffs on agricultur~lproducts bejustified. 5

l

II
I

John Vfuite, the leading authority on Argentina feels

Imeat is the crux of tho situation as far as the United States and
t:

~-~~~+4n~a

4

'8"

, . . . ; . " ' . " ..... . , . . -

40

..A.V

conce·~npd 6 He ~~.V~ thp U~it"_d St~.tcs has u[:ed the
..... . . " .

...

--

J-
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-
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ihoof and mouth discasn as "merely a subtcrfu!;e to keep
,

-

hi~h-cualiJ,
~
i
c

5 \'lo11e5, Ti~ .£ot: D0Cis:i.o:q,' 23$ ...
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ty but low-priced-Argentine meat out of the ,American market, wher
the American product could not compete"
apparent to Argentina.

~th it.'"!. This fact ~s

On the 9ther hand \\Thi te pointed out that

since Britain put a quota on"'ineat imports, there was no reason
why Argentina should expect us to buy the surplus.

However,

1~it

thought for reasons of international policy we should admit small
8 He maintained this would not upquantities of Argentine beef.
set our meat prices yet would greatly increase Argentinafs annual
,income and promote a more amicable feeling between the two countries.
During the Conference at Montevideo Hull was able to
win Dr. Carlos Saavedra Lamas to a certain degree as has been cen
tioned in Chapter II.

Upon his arrival at Buenos Aires in De-

cember 1933, Hull tried to secure the friendship of

A!"rentina~

pointing out that Argentina had worked "shoulder to

shoulde~,

par J

o
ticularly in promoting peace and a system of economic order./ He

hoped that Argentina would try to learn more about us and through
friendship and friendly intercourse the two countries would become a "powerful force for good in the, world. "10

\'7~rtenbaker

-

7 Ibid.
g !.?~£., 197.

9 lh:.ll, A4§r:23.0...e1?
J

L

10

Ibid.

~.-""'.-

e.~ gate~~!-s,

53.

\.

1'1'1

r

,I/:iii
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credited Hull with a profound influence in Argentine attitude

I

\i

lowing the r·lontevideo Conference.

He felt that Hull' s

~cooper-

ation with Saavedra Lamas was an important factor in bettering
..
11
·
th e t wo coun t rJ.es.

-

In February 1936, Sumner Welles addressed the Bar Association of Baltimore on the Trade Agreements Program.

In this

speech he mentioned the ill-feeling which had existed between Ar-

}'

gentina and the United States noting this fact:

',I

The Argentine press and economic publications were
filled with denouncements of the commercial policy pursued
by this Government and ~dth pleas to the Argentine people
that they buy from tho se ,mo bought from them, and that pur~
chases from the United States be restricted if not eliminated. • •• Today, not withstanding the practical difficulties ~lhich "tle both recognize, both Governments are cooperating in the closest manner to improve the flow of
co~~erce between them, to remove such barriers to trade as
can be removed without injury to the interests of either
one, and the two Governments have further cooperated in a
most cordial and effective manner for some time past in 12
the great peace work undertaken by the Chaco Conference.

1

I
i

I

An attempt was made to ratify
the Sanitary Convention
,

1

I

of 1935 between the United States and Argentina which would have·

I

alleviated the bitter feelings of Argentina over the beef ques,

Ition.

Failure of the Senate to ratify the Convention lessened

I
I
,104-10 5.
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Hull t s prestige an'd opened an old wound in the Argentine. 13

1

ratification of the Convention

was'preve~ted by

the Senators

.
ofi

The

the Farm Bloc who were "protecti·ng" the interests' of the western
cattlemen. 14

,

,

Very little notice was given in the newspapers to

The meeting place suggested was

through the State Department.

Buenos Aires in the hope of securing

~rgentine

cooperation.

The

agenda was prepared by our State Department and emphasized the
need of consultation in case of the threat of war. 15
shO'l1ed
I,;

Argentina

i·;illingness to cooperate provided the meeting place ,,;ould

be in Buenos Aires as had been suggested.

Plans, therefore, i-;ent

,I

!ahead
!

\

I

...

1'"
)

,I

~;fuite, L~{!!}!}::..'f}E~,

15
-
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In a special cable to the New
writing from Buenos Aires, said:

~

Time,§., John

'White

~1.

"The South American nations
"

have never awaited any other int~rnational conferencJ with so
much hope and enthusiastic optimism as ther display in awaiting
President Roosevelt's Pan-lunerican peace conference at Buenos
Aires. n16 He also said that they are planning to bring to the
Conference projects and proposals which will solve virtually all
the problems of the Americas.

Not only that, he felt that the

Latin Americans were confident of the success of the Conference.

Mr. White contended that this attitude grew out of the
success of the Montevideo Conference where Cordell Hull put forth
every effort to insure just such an attitude.

vfuite wrote:

It is only fair to say that their present enthusiastic
attitude toward the forthcoming conference is a compliment
to S7cretary?f State. Cordell Hull, to \1homSou~h Ame~~cans
""~"~mO"lslv
~~~e credJ.t for the succe~s
~+ ~~o
~~-~"'~r-~
'"-·.<J, ... ("...... t" __ . .
b.J..
0
.. .:.'
........ "
:. ',' .'.. '.-' ,"'"
Conference, and it is significant that the enthusi2.GL'l for
the forthcoming Buenos Aires conference dates from the announcement that Mr. Hull would head the United States delegation.
L~~

\,

V

.".

C~

... ,

,,_'AO.~

~.-'

~_,

Upon their unprecedented experiences at Montevideo the
South Americans base their present confidence that the forth
coming conference ,'lill accomplish results in the \"ray of sOlVl
ing inter-American problems. This very attitude is the most
~romising featur.e of the preparation for the Buenos Aires
conference, because it is promising of a successful outcome. I
?1,,:) South A."'!lericans ar.e going to Buenos Aires confic.ent of I
cuccess and prepared t~o cooperate for the com~l1on \';elfa:~e.17
i

I

Ii , - 16

r
I

..
17 .....Ib:Ld
..

!~i

N21!

.Yo~k !!.~, April 19, 1936, pt. 4,
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In August of 1936 an editorial appeared in the

~ ~

Times entitled "The President on Peace" in which ;t told of President Roosevelt's reference tp our cordial relations and conciliations with South America brought about by his administration.
The editorial said:

"Mr. Roosevelt is strongly of the opinion

that the forthcoming Pan-American Congress in December at Buenos
Aires will round out and solidify this work of friendship, so as
to make it certain that war shall be banished from this entire
hemisphere. nlB The editorial also commented on the praise which

I
I

~~.

Roosevelt gave to Hull for his part in breaking down the

"senseless barriers to international trade.,,19
Again in September the New lork Times contained an article written by Bertram D. Hulen in which the accomplishments
,of the administration's Latin American policy were reviewed, not(;

i

I

I

,I

so that none of our armed forces remained on foreign soil in the
\

'ttlestern Hemi sphere; the abrogation of the Platt Amendment and the
renunciation of our right to military intervention in Panama; the

18

Ib~.,

19 lli.£!.

August 15, 1936, pt. 1, 14:1.
\

,
l

.1

l
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success of our delegation at the Montevideo Conference. 20 l.u-.
Hulen looked forward to the Conference with hope and optimism because of the increased good will.which had been created by the

•

--

.

policies of Cordell Hull.

In November the Chicago Daily Tribune had an editorial
on "New Friends for the :r..lonroe Doctrine" based on a dispatch from

Mr. Ingrey reported a

Norman Ingrey, Tribune correspondent.

change of attitude toward the Monroe Doctrine had begun to appear
in South America.

The editorial quoted

1e. Naci6n which said:

I"South America has now only the ~~nroe Doctrine to fall back upon. "21 Ingrey said Musso1ini was the reason for this change r;~
attitude because of his imperialistic tendencies in Ethiopia.
The Tribune concluded its discussion of this change of feeling to

.

~':~~l -:-.~:,o

1',",):r:'.!'r:'9

Conference.

Doctrine

by

pOinting to the core:.........

~'.'E'nQs

Aires·

)

j

I

" • • • perhaps we shall find its atmosphere Dore

friendly than hitherto.,,22
Roosevelt traveled to Buenos Aires to open the Conference.

According to the .....-Ne'lfl -----York Times
- Roosevelt was ' . . elcomed ns
20

\I

i5,
~

1936, pt.

L.4:

1f)

•~

~

21
22~

Ibid., September

~O,

pt.

4, 7:4.

La Naci6'n, cited in Chicago Daili-" Tribune,
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no one else ~ad been welcomed. 23

Roosevelt declared that non-

American states who sought to commit acts of

aggre,~sion

would '.
; ,;

find the Western Hemisphere "prepared to consult together for our
mutual safety and our mutual @Ood. H24
Cordell Hull sought to win the Argentine

delegationand~

in a sense did secure some cooperation from Saavedra

lr~s

but

the former cool, distant feeling was apparent once more.

Hull
was deeply grieved at this coolness and a new Argentine bloc. 25
Saavedra Lamas, Hull felt, had been unduly impressed

\'rl.::.~.3

League and was bound to oppose anything which was opposed to the
League.
Sumner Welles maintained it was at this Conference in
Buenos Aires that Hull developed such an antipathy to Argentina. 26 Welles said that at the Conference he was forced to act
as

interpreter for Hull and Saavedra

LarJ.:'.S and. :~(; :l~-:_:'·:·

Hull's remarks because he feared an 'open brawl.

He attributed

Hull's ill-feeling to Lamas's opposition to the leadership of the

IUnited States, and his failure to see Hull off at the end of the
23

'- Hull, ~Gmoirs,

i

2l~

~

i

~

606.

~

r
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I

~

York T5.mes" December 1, 1936, pt. 1, 1: 8; also

I, 497e
Rosenman, f£~ Papet~
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Conference, despite the fact that Hull had unofficially suggested
~.

Saavedra Lamas receive the Nobel Peace Prize.

27

. ,.

The Conference was presented with Hull t s program to: ,
coordinate the five existing peace'treatiesinto one common agreement; to secure a definite agreement to cO'nsult together in
case of a threat from without or of trouble from within; to set
up a common neutrality policy in the event of war or other form
of conflict between the American republics.

As usual Argentina

blocked the attempts of Hull, remembering her old grievances or
corn, wheat and beef and remembering, too, the failure of the
I

United States Senate to ratify the Sanitary Convention of 1935.
Hull was disappointed in the outcome of the Buenos
Aires Conference because of the obstructionist attitude of Ar-

Ht:"\','re"~r

. ":A"i't.5 ....... ,., 28

so!"!e good was

a.ccom~li. ~hed and Hull outlines

these three main points agreed upon by a':l ;

.c.:;.~l" "" ~

The first ''las that the American hemisphere has a distinct and peculiar contribution to make because no nation
in it is driven by any compulsion or professes any right to
threaten the peace of its neighbors. The second was that
the only safety for all nations is loyal acceptance of a
rule of law under which the integrity of every country,
large or small, will be assured. The third was that renunciation of war and other similar declarations must be
implemented by a method of action \';hich CQ~ set into operation almost inztantaneously the cooperative effort of

I1-------i

27

,

,I

~., 105.

I
28 Hull, l,J.cmoi.:r:~, I, 501; ,also Welles, Jilt£:-;t:O":r:
ID';d.sion,206-207.
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the hemisphere in the direction of pacific settlements. 29
The Conference at Buenos Aires, said Welles, was "intrinsically the most important

i~ter-American

gathering that has

ever taken place. "30 'V'elles'maintained there "'lere two issues at
Buenos Aires:
The first was whether the American republics would agree to create some workable machinery to operate promptly
whenever intercontinental disputes threatened a breach of
the peace or whenever the security of the hemisphere was
menaced from abroad. The second "'las whether they "lOuld
jointly recognize that a threat to the safety of anyone of
them involved the security of the remaindero Unless these
two principles could be established, no regional system
could be developed, and no hemispheric unity could be achieved ,:Jhich could be depended upon as a protection in
time of i~~inent danger.31
While Roosevelt was in Buenos Aires, he learned that
much of the antipathy of Argentina fqr the United States was due
~to

the beef question.

Before he left Argentina, he promised to

bring hi s influence to bear upon the Senate in ol'd,cr to
get the Sanitary Convention of 1935' ratified.

'I.'~:i

':'.::d

This promise en-

couraged the people of Argentina, but they were to be disappointed as Roosevelt was unable to override the powerful cattle bloc
\

29

I

.30 \Velles, ~ !~
~sJsions, 104.

i

I

i
/

Hull, Memoir s, I, 503.

.f.2!: Deci..§..io"a, 206; also

31 Welles, ~ ~ for Decision, 206.
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of the Western states.)2
~

on January 4, 1937, printed a

quot.~

.from Leland

Stowe, who cabled his paper the Republican New York
~

.

from Buenos Aires:

Hera~q ~-

"It i-S agreed that the prestige of the

United States has never been so high among its twenty sister American republics as at present, and the good will dividends of
the President's Good Neighbor policy should be'a great asset in
the next few years, especially if Europe goes to the brink of
war. n33
At Buenos Aires the republics agreed to consult with
each other in case of a threat to peace within the Western Hemisphere, but the idea of a permanent Inter-American Consultative

A common neutrality policy was kept as

Committee was dropped.
''''''':'r''t:'::''.'11

ob5~cti ve

but

e~.ch

count.ry
with its treaty obligations. J4

"r~.s

Another convention adopted

free

~s

t·r,. :~.ct.

more

a

in accordance

~mportant

than the

one above because it dealt with action in case' of a threat to
peace from the outside.

Under this convention they agreed to

. consult and collaborate in the event of a

menac~

to their peace

~

:/-------

II

32 \\fhi tney H. Shepardson, The United States in World
Aff"irs, 1937, Me., York, 1938, 145-140. .. -

'

I

j l.,:[!.ry

I

JJ NeVi York ~ts~£ !riQ..une, cited in !h~\2.~ XXIX, Jart- .
4, 1937, 13.

34
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from any source.
Thus, for the first time, the American ,.Republics sought
to lay the groundwork for meeting the threat to their peace
which might come at any time as war clouds lowered o~er Europe. The :Monroe Doctrine protected them from dangers over-'
seas, but that doctrine"had come to assume in the minds" of
many of their leaders a connotation of domination of the
"[estern Hemisphere by the United' States. Under the new convention the American Republics took on~ step in the direction of a hemispheric 1~nroe Doctrine. J5
On April 15, 1937, the

~ ~

Times contained an edi-

torial on "Pan American Day" in which was discussed the Latin Am
erican relations.
~

The President had given an address on Pan Am-

erican Day in which he told his listeners of the notable improve-

Iment in inter-American relations since 1933.

The editorial said:

• • • until recently Pan-America was little more than a
. I.
phrase expressing lofty aspirations, has within the last
four years been given substantial content by President
Roosevelt's good neighbor policy. Secretary Hull, by inspiring confidence in the United States among Latl.n rLrneric
.',~l"··:""·-·:
nnd b··
hi- S ""'eroistent
ad.. rocac'" of f ..... ·',·,.,.'r· 7." ,.~,,~ re<:..
'J
1:-'''
r1
"J.·ons
'nas
o~~e'!ldi·
1y
a
'f"ranc
d
+··1.0
Frr.,v ' .~ . ."'1,~~~1,...
i'-·,1-~4'p.·>·':;
1a .., . ,
.... \" '-'
... " . . . .
yo .• ",
"
v ~. Iv '.'.- ":'"(~
• -'But the progress ~ms in turn facilitated by Assistant Secretary Sumner '\fJelles and his c'olleagues in the Latin American Division of the State Department, who labored so intelligently to prepare the necessary technical projects and
to cl·ear a'ttlay the accumulated encumbrances of years. Uithout this preparatory \'lOrk the Buenos Aires Conference and
its large promise for the future might indeed have been impossib1e.3 o
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The eight agreements reached at Buenos Aires w'ere submitted to the President who in turn submitted them to the Senate
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I

I

tor ratification. In commenting on this tact Harold Hinton wrote
from Washington:

"The submission to the Senate this \-Teek ot the

most important of the agreements reached at Buenos Aires • • •
marks another step in the development of the 'good neighbor'
policy which President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull have been pa•

tiently evolving for four years.,,3?
Hinton was careful to point out the opposition of Argentina to the neutrality legislation proposed, attributing it to
the obligations of Argentina to the League of Nations and her
commercial relations with Europe. 38 Hinton felt that the Buenos
Aires Conference showed a remarkable advance in the name of peace
because none of the countries showed any inclination to break the
peace.
Another valuable step was achieved, according to

Hinton~

1

37

~., May

-Ibid.
-

30, 1937, pt. 4, 7:6.

38 Ibid.
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The

i~terest

in the Buenos Aires Conference was not so

widespread as it had been in the Conference held··at Montevideo.
The New

~

Times was one paper which did follow the Conference.

I>lost of the papers did report-the warm reception given' to Roosevelt but they did not follow the Conference as had been done previously.

After the Conference interest died dO\1n in the events

which concerned Hull and his Latin American policies.

Little or

noth!ng appeared in the press because there was little which was
startling or new to be presented to the people •. However, there
was one short article on Hull's defense of the Sanitary Convention.
As has been pointed out, Roosevelt realized that the
ratification of the Sanitary Convention would go a long way to,.~.,ard

implementing the good neighbor policy in Argentina, as the

failure to remove the prohibitions on beef had long been an open
sore to the Argentines.

He, therefore,
tried to exert his in,
,

fluence to have it ratified.

Hull tried to secure its ratifica-

tion in order to encourage further better relations with

Argen~~

tina.
_ .......
0;;;.;;.;;. carried the article in which Hull
The _
New York
Times
~

iappealed for the ratification of the Sanitary Convention and atjtempted to assuage Argentina's sensitivity over beef.

The Con-

I,vcntion

.

! ther

,I

provided for sanitary embargoes on a regional\ basi z ::-s-

than a national basis.

This would allo\'! beef from Patagonia

I'

I
j

I
4

;
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to be admitted since this area showed no evidences of hoof and
, outh disease.

To Hull this was a fairer way to treat the situ-

He asserted the pending treaty would contribute to "a
ealthy expansion of our

mark~ts

tor our farm products through

aiding the recovery of our foreign trade.~4l
Thus beef continued to be the sore spot between the United States and Argentina because the failure to ratify the Sani
tary Convention showed the hopelessness of the situation despite
ullts efforts at neighborliness and good will.

It was more im-

portant to protect the men of the cattle industry, not trom the
hoof and mouth disease which did not exist in Patagonia, but from

the importation of beef by the United States which would have
strengthened the ties and induced Argentina to buy from us because we bought from them, thereby increasing the flow of trade
etween the two countries.
In defense of our position, White pointed out that in
1937, we bought 102,000,000 pesos of linseed from Argentina and
Great Britain bought 180,000,000 pesos of chilled beef but that
no mention was made by Argentina of this purchase on our part.
tJther countries restricted or prohibited the importation of meat
from Argentina without the action ever being made a political
,iszue, as was the case in our action. 42

1--41
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7, 1937, pt. 1, 11:1.
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Another"offense on our, part which.irritated Argentina
was the refusal to allow Argentina to serve her o.wn meat at her
pavilion at the New Yo"rk and San Francisco Fairs. 43 Yet these .,
Fairs were supposed to increase neighborliness in the world%
President Ortiz was elected to the presidency in 1937
and the

!2!! ~imes

expected him to continue the policy of
friendly cooperation with the "United States. 44 After the elec~

tion the Ortiz government announced a step which was hailed by
our press.

There was to be an end to the secrecy and censorship

which had existed in Argentina for some time.

The

~ ~

Times

"This is a complete reversal of the retiring govern-

commented:

ment's policy of handling the news."45
The infiltration of Axis agents into Latin America
seemed to go unnoticed by our press.

Our diplomatic representa-

ti ves, however, continued to report case after case of

~,;azi

penc-

tration "and the buildup of propaganda against the United States.
We were accused of intervention, monopoly of trade, and favoritism.

"

,

Prior to the opening of the Lima Conference in 1938,

43 Weil, Argentine Riddle, 14-15; also Beals, "Argentina vs United States", Curre'ntITis-tory, L, July 1939, 28.

I
f

~

44

~ Yor~

Jimes, September 12, 1937, pt. 4, 4:1.

45

~., February 23, 1938, pt. 1, 16: 2. \ :-
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-

the New York Times featured an article by Harold Hinton under the

-

Torch:~.

ti tle "Hull Again Takes Up the Pan American

I-ir. Hinton

reminded us that the Secretary of
. State was the one who has real1y given meaning to Pan Americanism.

He said:

" • • • much of,

the impetus that he has given to closer inter-American relations
has been tbe result of his

o~~

reasoning; he has not coasted with

events, letting them shape his course for him."46

Hinton reiter-

ated some of Hull's accomplishments and his very human approach
to the problems of the Americas, where, he realized, "problems
may differ, but men remain men. n47 According to Hinton, this
accounts for Mr. Hull's popularity in Latin America and for the
ngood press" he received in Latin America. 4$
As Hull left for Lima where the Eighth Pan American
,Conference was to
~republics

b~

held, he questioned whether the rest of the

would realize the serious threat

New world. 49

Y"h::'c~:

",:.- .. ~, .....,..:"

He wondered about Argentine cooperation; Saavedra

Lamas was no longer Foreign Minister; he had been replaced by
Jos& Maria Cantilo.

1Lima

Cantilo had urged the postponement of the

Conference informing our representative in Buenos Aires that

i

46 Ibic!. , November 20, 1938, pt. 7, 6:1.

~

48 Ibtd.

i

49 Hull,

I
I

t

,

I,

Ibid.
47 .......

-

\
l'1emoir~,

I, 602.

~"

..

~--~;-.-'-*-'----~~~-~'-

. :____'_e_ff-_'_'_"_____________________

__'_h1_·U._______

&___'_'_·'?~·~.0WW_W

.*_~l_

121
Argentina believed in a policy ot continental solidarity and collaboration but could not be expected to turn her 5ack on Europe!
On December 5, 193$, just a few days before the opening
of the Conference, John Whi te'-sent a specia'l 6able to the

-countries were:

York Times from Lima, Peru.

~

•

According to him the Latin American

preparing to push hard at the forthcoming Pan American Conference to torce the United States to put the Good Neighbor
policy into a concrete form that will insure its continuance
after the termination of President Roosevelt's administration.
At present the Good Neighbor policy is merely a declaration of policy contained in President Roosevelt's inaugural address. The Latin Americans have come to Lima determined to implement that declaration by means of international agreements that would have the force of treaties. 5l
White added that the good neighbor policy will continue to work
one way trom nnorth to south at the expense of American investors. n52

He granted relations bet\"leen the United Stat.es ~~nd t:_:.'

Americas to be friendlier than at any other time, but, he continued nthe United States has lost much prestige throughout Latin America as a result of its failure to take a stronger stand
on the confiscation of American oil fields by Bolivia and MexI

50 Ibid.; also Edward Tomlinson, nMeaning of Lima",
Current History, XXXIX, February 1939, 37.

51

I
I
?

Ne~ ~

52 Ibi,d.

Times, December 5, 193$, pt. 1, 1:$.
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On December 6, 1938, a United Press

di~patch

from Lima,
. i

Peru warned that na group of South Ameripan nations led by Argentina laid the groundwork·-today for a dip10matic

ba~tle

at. the

Eighth Pan American Conference against President Rooseveltts program for the defense of the Western Hemisphere. n54 The dispatch
went on to stress the importance of the Conference because of the
developments in Europe and the Far East and also because of
Roosevelt's declaration that preparation must be made for the defense of the Americas.
The
Conference.

~

.I2r.!

.;;,Ti;;o·m~e_s

was doubtful of the outcome of the

This paper wondered about Argentina and her usual

opposition to proposals of cooperation and help~55

Would Argen-

tina oppose the delegations at Lima as was her usual manner?
iii

The United Press di spatch from Lima on December 7,

1'1

1938, said Roosevelt was winning the, Latin American states to the

li!11

solidari ty plan as approval seemed certain. 56

II!II'

Despite this op_·

timistic report, the United States was reluctant to seek written

,1/

accords because of Argentine opposition to any proposals from thel

1.:1

Iii

I:

Ibid.

53

-

54

Chicago

I,

Dai1~~,

December 6, 1938, pt. 1, 5:5.

55 New York
- Times, December' 8, 1938, pt. ,I, 1: 2.
56 Chicago ~y- News, December 7, 1938, pt. 1, 1:3.
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United States.

~

Jose Maria Cantilo, the Argentine Foreign Minis-

ter, declared formal pacts to be

..

unnecessary~ecause

it was under

stood the Americas would stand ~ogether in the event of invasion. 57 The dispatch from the United Pres's pointed dut that th~
issues were vast.

"They may mean success or failure for men and

nations far removed from the Western World.,,58
The United Press dispatch of the next day said the dele
gates had begun to fall in line with a,program calling for continental solidarity against foreign aggression. 59 No mention was
made of Argentine opposition in this release.
John Whitaker, writing from Lima for the Chicago Daily
News made several interesting observations from there.

He told

how "whispering in the, ears of representatives of the other twenty American republics whom he buttonholed in smoke-filled hotel
rooms, Secretary of State Cordell Hull has envisaged this hemispherets defenses as military and political as well as econom)

ic.,,60

To Whitaker, Hull had triumphed over Cantilo's propaganda

against Yankee imperialism and dollar diplomacy and had won prestige and honor in the eyes of the Latin Americans because of the

57

New

~

Times, December

a,

1938, pt. 1, 16:2.

5a Chicago paily News, December 7, 1938, pt. 1, 1:3.
59

!Ei£. , December 8, 1938, pt. 1, 4:1.

\

60 Ibid. , December 9, 1938, pt. 1, 1:6.
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manner in which Hull handled the Mexican relations over the sei-zure of oil fields and properties.
si tuation, according to the
South America, even if it
business interests."

cab~e,

This handling, of the !v1exican
"ha~

brought good will in t;

has-scandaliz~d
~

61

somJ'North

·

America~O v

4

?
, <f

Hull was anxious to get a resolution adopted which was
strong yet acceptable to the delegates.

His proposal bound

the republics to resist any threat, either direct or indirect, to their peace, safety, or territorial integrity on
the part of any non-American country. In case the peace of
anyone of them were disturbed by direct or indirect interference on the part of one or more non-American governments
in a matter pertaining to national sovereignty, the Republics proclaimed their common concern and their purpose to
make their solidarity effective.to resist such threats. The
Republics agreed to hold meetings of their Foreign ~linis
ters every two years, and a special consultation of these
~nisters could be called by any American Government if .the
occasion for it arose. 62

I,

'1'1

I:!

This proposal was strong, but Hull felt that thes{!'

~t:,~re

extremely serious times and, therefore, needed an extremely

III

strong resolution which would insure the safety and cooperation
of all the Latin American republics.

He felt this was not the

time for half-measures; the republics must be united, firm, and
strong.
An interesting editorial appeared in the

Chica~

Daily

Tribune which poked fun at the idea of trying to unite the repub-

61

Ibi~.

\

62 Hull, !;.1emoirs, I, 603 •. _
__
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lics against the -dictators, since most

or

the Latin American

countries are dictatorships themselves and have been for years.
The Tribune mentioned the little democracy which existed in Cen-

.

tral and South American countries; Europe was in the same position with few exceptions and these exceptions were weak from a
military point of v1ew. 63 The conclusion drawn by the paper was:
A realistic foreign policy would recognize these facts
as facts, there are no allies upon whom we can count. ~le
cannot rescue Europe from itself, but if we are wise and
maintain our army and navy in a reasonable state of preparation we can -prevent Europe from imposing its barb r ism
upon us and our neighbors. The rest is applesauce. 64
On the eve of the Conference, in Time's viewpoint,
Hull and his Chief's good neighbor policy had notably softened
Latin American distrust of the United States, but by no means re
moved it entirely.65
Hull and Cantilo addressed the opening session of the
Conference and there was a similarity between the speeches which
seemed to indicate a unanimity of ideas. 66
clear:

He

Hull made his point

was condemning outworn philosophies that "for centu-

ries held men in bodily slavery and spiritual degradution tt and

16:2.

63

p.hicag£ Dai1t Tri.bune, December 9, 1938, pt. '1,

64

Ibid.

65

"Hull , 193$," Time, XXXII, December 12\ 1:-938, 12.

-

66 Ibid.

~
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he hoped for the adherence of nall other. nations or groups within
nations wh!ch, at times against great odds, and

i~

the face of
heartbreaking difficulties, are working for a better world. n67
According to Hinton who cabled tnis article, Hull's speech was a
personal victory.

His speech was greeted with roaring applause

throughout and after its conclusion.

At the ending of the speech

Cantilo rushed forward to greet Secretary Hull and escorted him
to his place. 68 ,
Hull considered the next ten days the most difficult of
his career. 69 The apparent warm friendly attitude of Cantilo and
his cohorts had vanished into thin air.

Cantilo left his dele-

gation and disappeared into the Chilean lakes area after the
opening session.

This showed how lightly he had taken the situi

ation and how much cooperation could be expected for the rest of
the sessions since he instructed the Argentine delegates to do
little or nothing without first consulting with him.

These in-

structions brought about delay and ill-feeling.

Hull felt that
Cantilo had run out on the Conference in order to kill it. 70
An article appeared in the

67

~ ~

Times discussing

~.

68 Ibid.
69

Hull, Memoirs, I, 605.

70

:ll1i.

,
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Argentine opposition.

The writer said:

The Argentine republic has 20ng been a hotbed of hos- ti1ity to us. Suspicion of our motives has never died here.
\\'hen the delegates left here for the Conferenc'e, emph,asis.
was carefully laid on the fact that it would stick close to
the traditional Argentin-e- policy--a prominent ingredient of
Which is opposition to anything even remotely North American. 71
The press in Berlin had comments to make on Hull's
speech in Lima.
This
lin.

They dubbed the speech as "Dollar Imperia+ism".

copywrited by the

dispatc~

~ ~

Times was sent from Ber-

It read:
The German press commenting on Secretary of State Cordell Hull's speech in Lima Peru, emphasizes "dollar imperialism ff , of which the United States is accused here in its
relations with Latin American countries. The press ridicu1 7d as laughable" the possibility of a "threatened invasJ.on".

72

Tne Berliner Lokalanzieger said:
Hull brought forward everything with which to atte~~t
to excuse Washington's hegemonic wishes before the South'
Americans. The latter will, on their part, supposedly be
thankful for this, for they have experienced the fac-t that
his majesty, the dollar, iS Q rie 0'£ the most inhuman dictator
ships in all world history. 7j
The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung called the speech "professional" and said it was to be expected in view of the recent
statements of President Roosevelt and his government, "wi thou.t
Times, December 12, 1939, pt. 1, 12:2.

71

N~w'~

72

Chica~q p~ill

Tribune, December 11,

193~,~pt.

1,

110 : 6 •
73 Ibid.
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leaving much impression behind".

The same paper also commented

that the Latin American countries wer"e none too eager "to sail

1
1

in North American waterways without a rudder."74

i,1

I

In a scathing editor1al the Chicago Daily Tribune accused President Roosevelt and Hull of warmongering in South America at the Lima meeting for reasons purely Political. 75 The

,llii
"

Tribune saw no evidences that the dictators Hitler and

l~ssolini
III
/i

were about to invade the Americas but it does see a serious dan-

"

ger of Latin America meddling in the affairs of Europe because of

III;
/,

I

a resolution being prepared by Argentina and Mexico regarding mediation in the Spanish war. 76 However, the Tribune admitted sooe
basis for fear of a commercial aggression.
cluded with this statement:

\'

II/I

The editorial con-

Ii i

WIf the dictators of Europe are

seeking to monopolize Latin-American trade we may have to take
some steps to counteract their tactics.

Promoting a war scare

will not help us think about the commercial problem more clearly.,,77
Argentine opposition continued and there was some feeling against Hull according to John Whitaker.

Whitaker maintained

\

I,

I

I
I

74

llii.

75

~.,

76

Ibid.

77

Ibid.
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i/
!

that some of the delegates Hare fed up with SecretarY Hull's in-

I

sistence there must be no quarrels in public and that conference
.
7$
measures must be brought forward only upon unanimous consent. "
vlhitaker said that Hull took ..a; middle of the road course but he

I

felt confident "the conference will end with a unanimous chorus

I

it.n7~

singing a tune pitched just about where Marse Cordell likes
Alfred Landon was one of the delegates to Lima who
spoke at the Conference.

This pleased the

Chicag~

III

Daily News.

This paper wished the delegates at the Conference would speak out
as·Landon had.

They accused the State Department of going "to

almost any lengths to spare the supposedly hypersensitive feelings of our Spanish-American neighbors. "80

-

The News said:

the one-way traffic in our so-called good neighbor policy_
We want to be good neighbors, certainly but we would like to
see a little more reciprocity than we are finding right now
at our southwestern frontier, or, for thqt matter, among
some of the neighbors assembled at Lima. 51
The Conference went on and after much debate and personal effort on Hull's part the Argentine Foreign

~linister

a draft of a new declaration which seemed acceptable and in
with the draft that Hull had prepared.
7$

80

sent
acco~

However, it did not pro-

Chicago Dail! News, December 20, 1938, pt. 1, 1:4.

79 -Ibid.
Ib~.,

81 Ibid.

-

December 21, 1938, pt. 1, 16:1. \ \
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vide for regular meetings of Foreign

l~nisters

were to be held whenever any republie.took the

but such meetings
.

i~tiative.

Christmas Eve tpe declaration was unanimously adopted.
.

ent effort on Hull's part had,- brought

~"

,

fo~th.

g2'

On

Persist-

,

Ii document whi em

wa~,

acceptable to everyone thereby assuring' the world of the unity
of the American Republics.
For Hull the steps taken at Lima were a great advance
over what had been accomplished at other conferences.

It was an

agreement which affirmed that the American Republics would help
.one another in case of foreign attack.

It provided for joint ac

tion against military action and also against infiltration methods.

Accordingly the responsibility to defend the hemisphere

was not the job of the United States alone but of all the Republics of the hemisphere. B;
The reason Hull strove so hard for solidarity was that
he did not want the outside world to have an opportunity to say
we were divided in matters of Latin American policy.
the closing address at the Conference, Hull said:

In giving

"And so in

this Declaration of Lima lies the future of the solidarity of th
American Republics. H84

82 Hull, Memoirs, I, 607.
83 Ibid., 608.
g4 !E.i£., 611.
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. Hull maintained the Declaration of Lima

tory for anyone country but for the New World. .. I,t
by Dr. Cantilo but followed

cl~sely

a vic-

~as ~ot

l.s drafted

Hull's original draft.

I

~

Ac-

cording to the~ York Time~ it went much farther than ~&enti~a
had intended. f!5
t

•

Whitaker wrote from Lima and said the Conference ended
on a note of confidence in the United States due to the

"kin~li

ness, patience and sincerity of Hull •. Should it become necessary
to negotiate for naval or air bases the necessary good will will
have been achieved."

f!6

The Chicago Daily News ended its comments on Lima in
an editorial which complimented our delegation on its tact and
accomplishments at the Conference in face of the real truth that
these Republics are really not homogeneous but are separate entities, each with its own balance of power,

nationalis~,

econo~ic'

problems, jealousies, quarrels and, "yet out of this came a unanimous declaration which if loyally carried out, should take care
pretty well of the propaganda danger."

f!7

The Chicago Daily Tribune, in closing its discussion on
Lima, objected.

We have not been as victorious as we should have

f!5

~ ~

Times, December 26, 193f!, pt. 1, 22:2.

86

Chicago Daily News, December 27,

87

~.,

1938,\P~.

January 4, 1939, pt. 1, 18:1.

1, 1:9-
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.;
been; Peru was not the perfect host; we must keep a smiling front
among

~ ~

neighbors because of -the possibil;ty that some

Latin American dictator might make an alliance with some
state.

Fasc~st

88 Nothing complimentary was said of the Conference by the
o

Tribune.

From its viewpoint we had "been taken".
Sumner Welles said the Lima Conference accomplished

little beyond "implementing the basic principles adopted at
Buenos Aires. n89
Stuart said the Declaration of Lima was vitally important because it promised to defend contihental solidarity against
foreign intervention and provided the machinery to make it effective. 90
Accox-ding to Tomlinson, Hull was called the "Father of
American Solidarityn.

His success in uniting the Republics was
01
credited by every delegate or the Conference.;
The next step Which drew the attention of the press to

Latin American affairs was Roosevelt's approval of an order to
buy 48,000 pounds of corned beef from Argentina for the use of

88

Chicag~

Dailx Tribune, January 12, 1939, pt. 1,

14: 2.

89 Welles, Time for Decision, 208.
90

~1

Stuart,

;eR~rtm~~~ of State,

33e.

___________9_1___T_om
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the Navy.

Roosevelt based his approval on three conditions:

was cheaper than any

~f

it

the bids submitted by packers of the U-

ni ted States; it was the best corned beef available; i t wa~ gooA.,
. hb or1·1ness. 92
ne1g
-Naturally this order aroused a storm of protest in the
Senate as once again the cattle interests were being

~put

The Chicago Daily Tribune was calm in its editorial.

upon".

The editor-

ial mentioned the reasons which Roosevelt had given in

appro\~ng

the purchase and the protests of the Senators representing the
cattle interests. 93

Later another editorial in the Tribune said

that Roosevelt was attempting to reduce the American farmers to
peasants because of the support given to the Argentine people by
buying their product. 94

No one denied the report that Argentine

corned beef was superior to the American product. 95
The St. Louis

~

Dispatch reviewed the corned beef

situation in an editorial, brought on no doubt by the fact that
Congress had passed legislation which would forbid the buying of
corned beef from Argentina.

192-193.

.~
\

,

92 Rosenman, Public Papers 2! Roosevelt, VIII, 1939,
93

I

The editorial, "The Corned-Beef Fi-

Chica~ Dail~

Tribune, May 13, 1939, pt. 1, 1:1.

94 ~~, May 19, 1939, pt. 1, 6:1.
95 NevI York Times, May 16, 1939, pt. 1, 1~5~
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asco", asked just what were the facts in the case and promptly an
,

I

swered by saying the beef was

superior'~o

our

o~

product; the

oney paid to Argentina would find its way back'here in the form
of purchases of American goods: 96

The action showed, said the

editorial, that
sectional interests triumphed over the interests of the Nation as a whole in question of foreign trade. • •• The incident throws dramatic lights on Secretary Hull's reciprocal
trade policy by which, against tremendous obstacles, the
Secretary is trying to introduce against common sense and
sound business principles into our trade relations with the
world. 97
Shortly after the "beef fiasco" the war in Europe began
Naturally the press concentrated on the latest war news and comments on Hull's Latin American policies faded into nothing.

\'lar

news was of first importance.
Immediately after the Qutbreak of war the Latin American countries felt the need for a consultat:lon and
laid for the meeting in Panama.

p,l.::ll'~G ~,·':::·C

The result of this meeting in

September, 1939, was the Declaration of Panama which proclaimed,
neutrality and a zone around the Americas south of Canada in
which belligerents were to refrain from naval action in this area.

,

::

This declaration secured without too much opposition showed

96 St. Louis Post Dispatch, June 2, 1939} cited in
Congressional Record, 76tnlrrong., 1st Sess., Append~x, 2365.
~
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the value of the ,previous conferences at which the groundwork ha
been laid for such cooperative action ..
Bailey said that the Declaration of Panama is of im-

.

portance nas a spectacular

e~ample

of collective

Pan-Am4ri~an'ac

tion, as a step in the further 'multilateralization' of the lw1onroe Doctrine, and as an attempt to restrict belligerent action
98
the high seas in the interests of regi~nal security.n
The

0

failure of the declaration to function was laid to the fact that
the American Republics were unwilling to use force to enforce it
provisions. 99
Up to this point Hull had shown the world that the Republics could be united and pursue a course or action which was
of vital concern not only to our hemisphere but as it developed
100
to the concern or the whole wor1d.

98 Bailey, Diplomatic Hlstory, 762.

-

99 Ibid.
100 For a further consideration of the Argentine question and the attitude of the press refer to O'Malley, IvIary,
The Attitude of the United States Press Toward Ar~ntina from
1']J0-19/+ 7. ~iiPu'5lTshed 1VTaster' s Thesis, Loyolaum. versi"'tY;-cEicago, "Illl.nois, 1950.
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CHAPTER- V

-

CONCLUSION

In the closing chapter of his Memoirs, Cordell Hull
said:
In the past, until 1934, perhaps our most flagrant violation of our duty to the world was economic isolationism.
Ages of civilization have taught us that international commerce promotes material welfare, peace, and advancement.
Intellectual and social progress in the Ancient World, the
Middle Ages, and the Modern Era was the result in large part
of the reciprocal influence of nations on one another. But
we Americans have not fully learned this lesson. ~'le sho\"{ed
the world a true example of the right way from 1934 until
the end of the war by embracing a policy of liberal commerce, tariff reduction, and nondiscrimination, but since
the end of the war there has been evidence of tendencies to
return the United States to the disastrous course of the
twenties and early thirties. High tariffs do not bring us
prosperity. They do bring us unsalable surpluseslat home
and the resentment of other nations abroad. • • •
Thus Hull again states his philosophy on trade.

He be-

lieved firmly and sincerely in this--that the security of the nation was based on trade and nonintervention and noninterference
in the affairs of our neighbors, whether they be to the south of
our United States or in the Eastern Hemisphere.

His whole pro-

gram was based on an intelligent trade program.

These policies

1

Hull,

Mernoir~,

II, 1735.
136
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of good will, trade, nonintervention and noninterference were a
return to the earliest principles of our foreign policy.

Our

policies, if carried out by all, seriously and earnestly, would
make each nation a Good

Ne~ghbor.

Hull warns us, not only of the need for freer trade but
also that we must
practice moderation in our expressions of· opinion concerning
other nations. As a people we are too prone to condemn other nations and rulers, to apply. epithets, to caricature, to
ridicule. We forget that our sharp words are not buried in
newspaper columns or lost on the rostrum or radio. They
come to the knowledge of the governments and peoples they
anathematize; they are reproduced and commented upon by the
press and radio of those countries, which may not understand
our freedom of criticism~ and they hamper the conduct of our
foreign relations. • • •
This paragraph seems of paramount importance to the writer.

The

research for this thesis has shown without a doubt the need for
an intelligent and unbiased press at all costs.
damage has been done and ill-will created by the failure of some
members of the press, at times, to consider the good of the whole
rather than the good of the few; the good of the nation rather
than the selfish interests of one section our own country.

It is

hard for those beyond our boundaries to evaluate and understand
correctly our freedom of expression; a freedom which must be
safeguarded at all costs but it must be remembered by our press

I

2

!£i£., 1737-1738.

\

l
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that there is an attendant responsibility for every freedom which
we enjoy.

Our press, then, has a responsibility to safeguard the

good will of our neighbors just as Cordell Hull was willing to

---

do.

Sumner Welles' description of Hull seems to sum up completely the man who has had such a profound influence on world
policy as Secretary of State for twelve years and who deserves to
rank as a foremost proponent of the
United States.

~tin

American policy of the

Welles said:

He is a persuader rather than a leader. He relies on
the ultimate triumph of reason to solve all human problems.
He could not, if he would, coerce anyone into an intellectually repugnant course. His life, public and private, has
exemplified that kind of democracy, governmental, intellectual, and spiritual, in Which lies the future hope of the
human race.)

viii.

3 Welles, in the forward to Hinton,
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